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I. INTRODUCTION
Sir Francis Bacon wrote in 1597 that "knowledge itself is power."'
In no arena of economic and social relations has this statement proved
more true than in the context of modem business. In today's highly
competitive economic environment, even slight advances in
technology, minor improvements in production, and small refinements
in business methods can afford companies tremendous competitive
advantages over their market rivals. Indeed, maintaining exclusive
possession of valuable technical and commercial information often can
mean the difference between cornering a particular market and fighting
for financial survival.2
Given the potential competitive benefits of obtaining advantageous
information,3 modern business relations frequently resemble a Road
Runner cartoon, as innovative companies zealously endeavor to protect
their technical knowledge, procedural know-how, and client data from
the attempts of corporate predators to acquire that information.4 The
law plays an important role in this ongoing battle for information by
protecting information owners from the improper tactics of their
* Associate, Dewey Ballantine LLP, New York, NY; former law clerk to the
Honorable George M. Marovich, United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois; J.D., Northwestern University, 1993; A.B., Dartmouth College, 1990.
1. FRANCIS BACON, MEDITATIONES SACRAE (1597), reprinted in XIV THE WORKS OF
FRANCIS BACON 95 (James Spedding et al. eds., Scholarly Press 1969).
2. See Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 427, 427 (1995); Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K. Johnson, The Uniform
Trade Secrets Act: The States' Response, 24 CREIGtrrON L. REV. 49, 49 (1990).
3. "Advantageous" information includes any type of data that provides an economic
or technical benefit to the owner.
4. See Thomas P. Heed, Comment, Misappropriation of Trade Secrets: The Last Civil
RICO Cause of Action that Works, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207, 210-12 (1996);
William J. Holstein, Corporate Spy Wars, US NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 23, 1998, at 46
(discussing the tremendous loss that American companies are experiencing due to
misappropriation of technical information).
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hungry competitors.5
To date, the imposition of liability for the misappropriation of "trade
secrets" has served as one of the most potent and widely-used legal
mechanisms for the protection of commercially valuable knowledge.6
The common-law and statutory prohibitions of trade secret
misappropriation are important, if not the most important, components
in a legal regime that shelters intellectual investment. 7 However, a
detailed and thoughtful analysis of both the nature of valuable
commercial information and the various policies supporting protection
for such information reveals that defining and protecting only a single
class of proprietary data-"trade secrets"-is either underinclusive or
overinclusive, depending upon the breadth with which "trade secrets"
are defined.8 Consequently, what is needed is a second class of
protectable, proprietary information- "confidential information." 9
This category would fill the theoretical and practical gap between
"trade secrets" and "general skill and knowledge."' Indeed, as this
5. See I INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELING AND LITIGATION (MB) § 5.03[21[c]-[5], at
5-31 to 5-34 (Lester Horwitz & Ethan Horwitz eds., 1997) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY]; Dan L. Burk, Misappropriation of Trade Secrets in Biotechnology
Licensing, 4 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 121, 128-30 (1994); Stephen J. Davidson & Robert
L. DeMay, Application of Trade Secret Law to New Technology- Unwinding the Tangled
Web, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 579, 581-82 (1986); Pace, supra note 2, at 427.
6. See Burk, supra note 5, at 139-40; Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 581-82;
Miles J. Feldman, Toward a Clearer Standard of Protectable Information: Trade Secrets
and the Employment Relationship, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 151, 159-61 (1994); Pace, supra
note 2, at 428; Samuels & Johnson, supra note 2, at 49-50.
A trade secret generally may be defined as "economically valuable information that is
not readily available to the public or to competitors, and which is the subject of
reasonable efforts undertaken to maintain its secrecy." Denise H. McClelland & John L.
Forgy, Is Kentucky Law "Pro-Business" in Its Protection of Trade Secrets, Confidential
and Proprietary Information? A Practical Guide for Kentucky Businesses and Their
Lawyers, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 229, 230-31 (1997). One commentator has noted that,
"While many cases seek to define the term 'trade secret,' those definitions must be read
critically, because often they embody the specific fact patterns presented by the case,
and cannot be extended to a more universal fact situation." INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
supra note 5, § 5.01[2], at 5-5.
For a more detailed discussion of the most widely used definitions of "trade secret"-
the definitions contained in the First Restatement of Torts, the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, and the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition-see infra note 120.
7. See Burk, supra note 5, at 129; Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 581-82;
Feldman, supra note 6, at 159; Pace, supra note 2, at 428; Samuels & Johnson, supra
note 2, at 49-50.
8. See Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 596-98 (discussing judicial interpretation
of the definition of trade secret and what is protected).
9. See infra Part Il.B.
10. Courts and commentators traditionally have used the term "general skill and
knowledge" to denote non-protectable information generally and "personal knowledge
based on an employee's education, ability, and experience, and knowledge general to the
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Article reveals, courts frequently have recognized the existence of, and
afforded protection to, "confidential information" without formally
defining that category of knowledge."
This Article examines the courts' historical willingness to safeguard
valuable commercial information that does not rise to the level of
technical trade secrets.'2 Further, this Article analyzes the intellectual
and pragmatic inadequacy of modern trade secret law with respect to
the protection of such information. 3 The Article divides commercial
information into three basic categories based on the relative secrecy of
such information and explores the level of protection that should
properly be afforded each category in light of the various competing
policy interests sought to be served.'4 The Article then discusses the
various theories under which courts traditionally have protected
"confidential information. '5  Further, the Article explains the
theoretical and practical undesirability of protecting all commercially
valuable information as "trade secrets," the approach adopted by the
Restatement (First) of Torts (the "First Restatement"), the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (the "UTSA"), and the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition (the "Third Restatement").' 6 Next, this Article
argues for the creation of a formal category of "confidential
information" to minimize and/or to alleviate the problems associated
with the current two-tiered protective scheme, in which valuable
commercial data, technology and know-how is classified only as either
protectable "trade secrets" or unprotectable "general skill and
knowledge.' 7 Finally, this Article suggests that, even absent the
legislative or judicial creation of a formal category of "confidential
information," litigants, even litigants in UTSA jurisdictions, may
trade as a whole, as opposed to knowledge peculiar to the employer" specifically.
Feldman, supra note 6, at 165; see also MELVIN F. JAGER, 2 TRADE SECRETS LAW §
8.01[3], at 8-13 (rev. 1995).
The term "confidential information" historically has been used to denote non-
technical or transitory "business information of importance" or both-information such
as customer lists, supplier information and the like. Peter C. Quittmeyer, Trade Secrets
and Confidential Information Under Georgia Law, 19 GA. L. REV. 623, 624 (1985); see
also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.03, at 5-32 to 5-33.
11. See Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 628; infra notes 68-117 and accompanying
text.
12. See infra Part lI.B.
13. See infra Part 1ll.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II.
16. These theories include: breach of contract, interference with contractual relations,
breach of fiduciary duty, unfair competition, fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and
conspiracy. See infra Parts III.A-C.
17. See infra Part IV.
19981
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
continue to seek protection for "confidential information" using the
various theories identified and discussed in Part II of this Article.1
8
Accordingly, this Article analyzes the preemptive scope of the various
state statutes based on the UTSA and identifies the remaining viable
theories for protecting confidential information in UTSA states.' 9
II. THE NEED TO PROTECT "CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION"
Courts and commentators historically have been and continue to be
perplexed by the perceived intellectual and practical problems
associated with the problem of "confidential information."
Confidential information roughly can be defined as data, technology,
or know-how that is known by a substantial number of persons in a
particular industry (such that its status as a technical "trade secret" is in
doubt) but that, nonetheless, retains some economic and /or
competitive value by virtue of the fact that it is unknown to certain
industry participants. Although such confidential information
unquestionably is worth less than a true "trade secret"-that is,
knowledge possessed by one or very few actors in a particular field-
that information still is worthy of legal protection. Indeed, an analysis
of the three categories of commercial information, an examination of
the policies sought to be served by confidentiality law, and a review of
the courts' historical treatment of confidential information all reveal the
desirability and the feasibility of protecting confidential information
from "piracy" and/or wrongful disclosure.
A. The Three Categories of Commercial Information and the
Propriety of Protection
The first step in creating a comprehensive legal framework for the
protection of valuable commercial information is to classify the various
types of technical data and business knowledge that companies and
their employees may possess. Commercial information generally can
be divided into three basic categories: (1) information that is known to
substantially all persons in a particular field or industry (hereinafter
"Category 1 information"); (2) information that is known to a majority,
but unknown to a minority, of persons in a particular field or industry
(hereinafter "Category 2 information"); and (3) information that is
known to a minority, but unknown to the majority, of persons in a
particular field or industry (hereinafter "Category 3 information"). 20
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part V.
20. Without question, some commentators will maintain that this breakdown of
844 [Vol. 29
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1. Policy Concerns Underlying Confidentiality Law
To determine the level of legal protection that should be afforded to
each of these three categories of information, it is necessary to identify
the competing policy concerns that underlie and drive the law
pertaining to the preservation of commercial secrecy (hereinafter
"confidentiality law"). 2' The primary, long term goal of confidentiality
law is maintaining commercial morality.22 The tremendous economic
advantages that exclusive knowledge of technological and/or
methodological advances affords to companies in highly competitive
industries create enormous incentives for business rivals to acquire
their competitors' "secret" information, thereby eliminating, or even
reversing, legitimately gained competitive imbalances.
23
commercial information is overly simplistic and ignores the various factors aside from
secrecy which may be used to define proprietary knowledge. These factors include:
utility, public and/or industry availability, costs of development, and novelty. Yet,
while all of these factors are certainly significant and must be considered in formulating
a protective scheme, secrecy is the single most important variable in determining
information's commercial value. See 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS
(MB) § 1.03, at 1-86 to 1-98 (1997). As is discussed later in greater detail,
information's level of secrecy in a particular field impacts directly upon: (1) that
information's competitive worth to its owner or owners; (2) the existence of incentives
for competitors to attempt to acquire that information; and (3) the impact of protecting
that information upon employees' mobility. See infra notes 24-45 and accompanying
text. Accordingly, level of secrecy represents the simplest, yet most telling, basis for
differentiating and classifying proprietary data and know-how. See 1 MILGRIM, supra, §
1.07, at 1-308 to 1-323.
2 1. As used in this Article, the term "confidentiality law" refers to a body of law that
encompasses any and all statutory and common-law causes of action with respect to the
improper acquisition, discovery, or use of valuable commercial information. While
"trade secret law" is the term most commonly used to describe this area of jurisprudence,
that term, by definition, suggests that protection for commercial knowledge rests
primarily, if not exclusively, with an action for misappropriation of trade secrets. Yet,
as this Article illustrates, business information should be protected despite such
information failing to rise to the level of a statutorily-defined trade secret.
Consequently, the term "trade secret law" does not reflect the breadth of the law with
respect to the protection of commercial data as well as the term "confidentiality law"
does.
22. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-82 (1974);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995); INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.06, at 5-58; Stephen J. Davidson, The (Un)Faithful
Employee: A Review of Recent Copyright, Trade Secret and Related Cases Focusing on
Employees and Independent Contractors in the Computer Area, in COMPUTER LAW:
CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS A SATELLITE PROGRAM 425, 430 (PLI.: Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Course Handbook Series No. 272, 1989);
Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 582-86; McClelland & Forgy, supra note 6, at 233.
23. One commentator recently explained:
If there's any one trend driving the surge in corporate intelligence gathering,
it is the ceaseless rise in the commercial value of technology. The huge
research and development investments required to invent and perfect new
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Consequently, in the absence of any counterbalancing force, these
incentives would lead, and have led, corporations to employ immoral
tactics, including theft, fraud and corporate espionage, and to engage
in improper schemes to "obtain[] the desired knowledge without
paying the price in labor, money, or machines expended by the
discoverer. 2
4
Confidentiality law purports to eliminate or, at least, to minimize the
incentives to obtain competitively valuable information through corrupt
practices, rather than through independent effort.' Confidentiality law
effectuates this goal by punishing businesses and/or individuals who
engage in commercially undesirable practices and by protecting
businesses and/or individuals who acquire economically advantageous
knowledge through hard-work and extensive experimentation from
competitors' attempts to poach that knowledge.26 By increasing the
costs of employing immoral acquisition tactics and enhancing the
benefits of independent development efforts, confidentiality law
attempts to impose a moral code upon the business world with respect
to the procurement of proprietary information. 2" Accordingly,
confidentiality law assures that commercial actors do not employ theft
or chicanery in their quests to improve their competitive positions.
28
As one court noted: "The necessity of good faith and honest, fair
dealing, is the very life and spirit of the commercial world.,
29
A second and closely related goal of confidentiality law is
encouraging invention.30 More often than not, technological
innovations require substantial investments of time, money and
technologies, plus the sheer speed of product cycles, have raised the stakes in
the age-old quest to learn the other guy's secrets.
Holstein, supra note 4, at 48; see also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.06, at
5-58 to 5-59; Pace, supra note 2, at 427.
24. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir.
1934), modified, 74 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1935); see also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra
note 5, § 5.06, at 5-58 (discussing briefly incentives to appropriate trade secrets).
25. See Burk, supra note 5, at 128-29; Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 582-84.
26. See Burk, supra note 5, at 128-29.
27. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.06, at 5-58 to 5-59; 3 MILGRIM,
supra note 20, § 13.03, at 13-47 to 13-49; Burk, supra note 5, at 128-29.
28. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 506 at 5-58 to 5-59.
29. National Tube Co. v. Eastern Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C.(n.s.), 459, 462 (1902),
aff'd, 70 N.E. 1127 (1903), quoted in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
481-82 (1974)); see also Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 626-27 (discussing the trade
secret law's importance in maintaining "commercial morality" and good faith in the
market place).
30. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481-482; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39 cmt a. (1995); Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 583-84.
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effort.31 Given these high costs, companies face a problem: If they
cannot be assured that they will profit or gain a competitive advantage
by exploiting their innovations, then they cannot be confident that they
will recoup their initial investments in those innovations; and, if
companies cannot be confident that they will recoup their initial
investments, then they are without an economic motivation to innovate
in the first instance.32
In the absence of legal protection for valuable, independently
developed information, businesses would be less likely to commit their
finite resources to the creation of new technology because there is no
guarantee that they will benefit from that development. 33 Moreover,
without legal protection against corporate theft, those businesses that
continued to invest in innovation would be forced to expend a
disproportionate amount of money on "self-help" measures designed
3 1. See Pace, supra note 2, at 436.
32. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.06, at 5-59; Andrew Beckerman-
Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional Definition of Property?: A Jurisprudential
Analysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 613 (1994); Pace, supra note 2, at 436; Quittmeyer,
supra note 10, at 626-27 (discussing the importance of the trade secret laws in
maintaining competition and rewarding innovation).
33. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.06, at 5-58 to 5-59. The patent
laws are designed to encourage invention and product development by conferring upon
inventors the exclusive rights to exploit their works commercially for a term of years.
See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (West 1984 & West Supp. 1998); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c (1995); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.02,
at 5-22 to 5-23. Yet, the patent laws are, by themselves, insufficient for two reasons.
First, the protection offered by the patent laws would not encourage innovation with
respect to nonpatentable subject matter or to patentable subject matter which, for one
reason or another, would not meet the standards of patentability. As noted by the
Supreme Court:
Even as the extension of trade secret protection to patentable subject matter
that the owner knows will not meet the standards of patentability will not
conflict with the patent policy of disclosure, it will have a decidedly beneficial
effect on society. Trade secret law will encourage invention in areas where
patent law does not reach, and will prompt the independent innovator to
proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention. Competition is
fostered and the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite
patentable, invention.
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 485 (citations omitted).
Second, the ambiguity associated with the granting of patent protection may seriously
discourage inventors from making the necessary initial investment:
The risk of eventual patent invalidity by the courts and the costs associated
with that risk may well impel some with a good-faith doubt as to patentability
not to take the trouble to seek to obtain and defend patent protection for their
discoveries, regardless of the existence of trade secret protection. Trade secret
protection would assist those inventors in the more efficient exploitation of
their discoveries and not conflict with the patent law.
Id. at 487.
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to protect their innovations from piracy.'
By enabling companies to exclude rivals from utilizing innovations
obtained through improper conduct, confidentiality law eliminates the
need for inventive corporations to spend extraordinary sums on
precautionary confidentiality measures that increase the level of
investment required for profitable innovation and, consequently,
reduce both the incentives and the resources available to corporations
to innovate.35 Confidentiality law, therefore, decreases the amount of
time, money and effort that corporations must expend to assure that
they will be able commercially to exploit their inventions. This
savings decreases the total costs and enhances the overall profitability
of innovation.36  Further, confidentiality law enables an inventor to
34. As the Supreme Court has noted:
Alternatively with the effort that remained, however, would come an increase
in the amount of self-help that innovative companies would employ.
Knowledge would be widely dispersed among the employees of those still
active in research. Security precautions necessarily would be increased, and
salaries and fringe benefits of those few officers or employees who had to
know the whole of the secret invention would be fixed in an amount thought
sufficient to assure their loyalty. Smaller companies would be placed at a
distinct economic disadvantage, since the costs of this kind of self-help could
be great, and the cost to the public of the use of this invention would be
increased. The innovative entrepreneur with limited resources would tend to
confine his research efforts to himself and those few he felt he could trust
without the ultimate assurance of legal protection against breaches of
confidence. As a result, organized scientific and technological research could
become fragmented, and society, as a whole, would suffer.
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 485-86 (citations omitted); see also Holstein, supra note 4, at
46; Pace, supra note 2, at 439.
35. See Burk, supra note 5, at 128-29; Pace, supra note 2, at 440-41; Quittmeyer,
supra note 10, at 626-28.
36. See Pace, supra note 2, at 441; Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 626-27.
It should be noted that, unlike patent law, confidentiality law does not seek solely to
safeguard the interests of the first company to develop an innovation; but, rather, seeks
to foster the maximum beneficial amount of innovation by all companies. As explained
by one commentator:
Thus, while affording each company extra protection for its innovations
against disclosure by improper means and mistake, [confidentiality law] still
allows all other companies an equal opportunity to discover the same
innovation independently or by acceptable commercial means. This trade-off
leads to several desirable effects, each of which is related to the other. First,
the trade-off encourages companies to invest in complex innovations that are
not easily duplicated by its competitors, and discourages them from over-
investing in simple innovations. Second, it prevents companies from
obtaining monopolies over innovations that do not qualify for patent
protection and provides a strong incentive for companies to pursue patent
protection for innovations that do so qualify . . .. Finally, the
[confidentiality law] trade-off allows each company to search for new, non-
patentable innovations secure in the knowledge that it will be able to use any
Protecting Confidential Information
maintain the secrecy of new technologies and/or business methods
during the early stages of development and commercialization.37
Thus, confidentiality law preserves the time-advantage associated with
being the first producer of a new product or process and maximizes an
inventor's ability to capitalize on its discovery. 8
Balanced against confidentiality law's concerns for preserving
commercial morality and fostering innovation is the recognized need
for free competition and employee mobility. 39 Technological and
methodological innovation, as well as true price and product
competition, strongly benefit from the unfettered communication of
ideas and the unrestricted use of products and services based upon
those ideas.40 Only when inventive companies possess knowledge of
existing technologies can those companies advance the "state of the
art" by providing consumers with truly new, better or more efficiently
produced products. 4' Further, it is generally accepted that "no
restrictions should fetter an employee's right to apply to his own best
advantage the skills and knowledge acquired by the overall experience
of his previous employment."' 2
Given the importance of information exchange, if the law allowed
companies to preclude the unauthorized transfer or dissemination of all
useful data and knowledge ostensibly "owned" by them, other
commercial actors would be prevented from adapting or improving
upon even basic techniques. 43 Such preclusion would substantially
innovation it finds even if it is not the first acquirer of the innovation.
Pace, supra note 2, at 441-42 (footnotes omitted).
37. See Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 626-27.
38. See id.
39. See Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404 N.E.2d 205, 207 (Ill. 1980);
Davidson, supra note 22, at 427-29; Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 585-86;
Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 627.
40. See Davidson, supra note 22, at 429-30; Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 627.
4 1. See Gale R. Peterson, Trade Secrets in an Information Age, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 385,
423-24 (1995) (discussing the current evolution of trade secret law through the courts
and identifying areas of uncertainty); Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 626-27.
42. Jim W. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Schaefer, 298 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Minn. 1980). As
noted by the court in Standard Brands v. Zumpe:
[T]he employee who possesses the employer's most valuable confidences is
apt to be highly skilled. The public is interested in the reasonable mobility of
such skilled persons from job to job in our fluid society, which is
characterized by and requires the mobility of technically expert persons from
place to place, from job to job and upward within the industrial structure. And
the employee must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to change jobs
without abandoning the ability to practice his skills.
Standard Brands v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 259 (E.D. La. 1967).
43. See Feldman, supra note 6, at 171-72.
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hinder competition, and employees effectively would become "slaves"
to their employers, being prohibited from taking even the most
elemental knowledge with them from position to position. Thus,
confidentiality law attempts to walk the "razor's edge" between the
promotion of invention and the maintenance of free and open economic
markets by endeavoring to safeguard only information that is, to some
degree, unique and valuable to its owner.' Such information is the
type that rivals might seek to acquire quickly and cheaply (rather than
to develop through potentially costly and time-consuming independent
effort) and which employees do not need to work in their chosen
fields.45
2. Leaving Category 1 Information Unprotected
In light of confidentiality law's primary concern with providing a
beneficial balance between innovation and competition, there has been
little dispute as to the nature of legal protection which Category 1 and
Category 3 information should receive.46 Because Category 1
information4 7 is known to substantially all persons in a particular
industry, businesses have little incentive to attempt to acquire such
information from their competitors. Enabling companies to limit the
use and/or dissemination of such information would unnecessarily
restrict employees' mobility and would unduly hamper legitimate
competition.4 Consequently, Category 1 information should not be,
44. See Robert T. Neufeld, Note: Mission Impossible: New York Cannot Face the
Future Without a Trade Secret Act, 7 FORDHAM INTL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 883, 884-
85 (1997).
45. See Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 108 A.2d 442, 447 (N.J. 1954). As the court in
that case explained nearly a half century ago:
There is undoubtedly . . . an important policy which 'encourages employee
[sic] to seek better jobs from other employers or to go into business for
themselves.' . . . But there is also a policy which is designed to protect
employers against improper disclosures of information which their employees
have received in confidence .... Our judicial decisions have faithfully sought
to vindicate both policies by preserving to employees their unfettered right to
leave their employment and use elsewhere their acquired skill and knowledge
of the trade generally as distinguished, however, from any trade secrets
imparted to them in confidence and which they must continue to honor as
such.
Id. at 447 (citations omitted); see also Feldman, supra note 6, at 155-56.
46. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
47. Category I information is commonly referred to as "general skill and
knowledge." See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
48. See Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 584-86; Feldman, supra note 6, at 171-
74; Edmund W. Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secrecy Protection and the Mobility of
Management Employees: A New Problem for the Law, 47 S.C. L. REV. 659, 664-66
(1995-96).
850 [Vol. 29
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and is not, entitled to legal protection.49
3. Affording Legal Protection to Category 3 Information
Protecting Category 3 information, however, is entirely consistent
with the fundamental goals of confidentiality law. By definition,
Category 3 information is known only to a minority of persons in a
particular industry. 50 Consequently, assuming that such information
provides its owner or owners some economic, technological or other
productive benefit, Category 3 information derives tremendous
competitive value because it is unknown to a substantial number of
individuals and/or companies who properly could use such
information to their advantage. The more significant the benefit the
information affords and the greater the information's secrecy, the
larger the information's value.
Given the competitive value of useful Category 3 information, there
typically exists enormous incentives for competitors to attempt to
obtain that information for their own use.52 Moreover, it generally is
less costly and less time-consuming for competitors to seek to acquire
Category 3 information from its rightful owner or owners, rather than
to recreate that information through an independent research and
49. See Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 655-57 (noting that people should not be
prevented from practicing their professions for the reason that they have enhanced their
abilities as a result of prior experience and business affiliation).
50. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
51. This point can be illustrated by using a basic (albeit simplistic) numerical
analysis. First, assign a particular piece of information a numerical value between 0 and
10 representing the economic, technological or productive benefit that the information
affords its owner-0 being no benefit and 10 being tremendous benefit. Next, assign
that same piece of information a numerical value between I and 10 representing that
information's level of secrecy in the relevant field or industry-0 being "known by
everyone in the field" and 10 being "known by no one in the field other than the
inventor" (for Category 3 information this second numerical value will always be 5 or
greater, as such information, by definition, is known only to a minority or persons in a
field). See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Finally, multiply the two numbers to
arrive at a composite score-on a 100 point scale-representing the competitive value
of the piece of information in the relevant industry.
For example, assume that a process for forming (shaping) bicycle helmets has a
benefit level of 7.5 and a secrecy level of 8.25 (i.e. the process is unknown to 82.5% of
bicycle helmet manufacturers). That forming process has a value score of 61.86. Now
assume that a process for marking bicycle helmets has a benefit level of 7 but a secrecy
level of 8.9, yielding a value score of 62.3. The marking (etching or imprinting the
design) process would have a greater competitive value than the forming process-
despite the fact that the forming process is technically more beneficial to its owner-
because of the fact that fewer competitors are aware of and can capture the benefits of
owning the marking process.
52. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.06[l], at 5-58 to 5-59; Pace, supra
note 2, at 427.
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development effort, because valuable Category 3 information typically
is the result of extensive investment and/or creative genius. 53
Providing legal protection for Category 3 information is necessary
both to minimize the incentives for business rivals to procure such
information through theft and/or chicanery and to reduce rightful
information owners' costs in protecting such information from
piracy. 54 This added protection will enhance the overall profitability of
developing valuable Category 3 information in the first instance."
Further, because Category 3 information is unknown to a majority of
persons in a particular field and, therefore, is not crucial (even though
potentially useful) to those persons' participation in that field,
protecting Category 3 information will not unreasonably preclude
employees from changing employers or practicing their trade.5 Thus,
affording Category 3 information owners legal protection against the
unauthorized use of that information encourages innovation, promotes
commercial morality without stifling economic competition, and
substantially advances the fundamental goals of confidentiality law.5
4. Assessing the Proper Level of Protection for Category 2
Information
Unlike Category 3 information, for which legal protection clearly is
warranted, and Category 1 information, for which legal protection is
unquestionably inappropriate, Category 2 information lies within a
troubling gray area of confidentiality law. Even useful Category 2
information is known to the majority in a particular industry; therefore,
Category 2 information's overall competitive value is generally lower
than the value of similarly useful Category 3 information. It is,
53. This conclusion appears self-evident in light of the fact that if useful information
truly were cheap and easy to develop, then all individuals who could benefit from such
information presumably would own that information, a situation which, by definition,
does not exist with respect to Category 3 information.
54. See Pace, supra note 2, at 427; Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 626-27.
55. See Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 627.
56. See Kitch, supra note 48, at 665; Pace, supra note 2, at 427.
57. As one scholar explained:
By recognizing the special competitive advantage of information known only
to a few, and the resultant acknowledgment of the property interests in such
information, the interests of the owner, the mobile disclosee, and the
consuming public appear to be fairly balanced. The departing employee is not
permitted to carry off something of great value to his employer, whether it is
tangible, such as securities or plans and drawings, or intangible, such as
valuable data which constitutes a protectable trade secret.
3 MILGRIM, supra note 20, § 13.0312][c], at 13-54.
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therefore, less likely to be the target of corporate piracy. Moreover,
a blanket prohibition on a Category 2 information owner's employees'
use of that information following the termination of their employment
would unnecessarily restrict those employees' abilities to move
between companies possessing that information.'
Notwithstanding these facts, divesting Category 2 information of all
legal protection is inconsistent with the goals of confidentiality law.
Although Category 2 information's absolute value is less than that of
similarly useful Category 3 information, nevertheless, Category 2
information's relative value6 1 still may be great. 62 Consequently, the
owners of Category 2 information must still be wary of rivals'
attempts to pilfer that information for their own use. In the absence of
legal protection, the owners of Category 2 information must expend a
portion of their finite resources-time, money, and effort-to protect
their innovations from piracy.'
Moreover, permitting employers to prevent employees from
transferring Category 2 information to competitors who do not already
possess it, would not limit the employees' economic opportunities
unfairly. Employees could still market their services, including their
knowledge of the Category 2 information, to the majority of
58. See 3 MILGRIM supra note 20, § 1.03, at 1-86 to 1-98.
59. See Feldman, supra note 6, at 171-74; Kitch, supra note 48, at 664-65.
60. "Absolute value" denotes information's value to its owner in the relevant
marketplace as a whole.
61. "Relative value" denotes information's value to its owner vis-a-vis a specific
competitor.
62. For example, although a bicycle helmet manufacturer's awareness of a particularly
cost-effective plastic forming process that is known to seven of the manufacturer's ten
competitors is unlikely to afford the manufacturer a large competitive advantage in the
bicycle helmet marketplace as a whole, that awareness will afford the manufacturer a
tremendous competitive advantage over any one of the three competitors who do not
already possess knowledge of the forming process. For these three competitors, there
are enormous incentives to acquire knowledge of the process. See, e.g., A.L. Labs., Inc.
v. Philips Roxane, Inc., 803 F.2d 378, 381-82 (8th Cir. 1986); C.R. Bard, Inc. v.
Intoccia, Civ. A. No. 94-11568-Z, 1994 WL 601944, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 13, 1994);
Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 900 (Minn. 1983);
Ultra-Life Labs., Inc. v. Eames, 221 S.W.2d 224, 232 (Mo. App. 1949); Sybron Corp.
v. Wetzel, 385 N.E.2d 1055, 1056 (N.Y. 1978); Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting
& Packaging, Inc., 397 S.E.2d 110, 112-13 (Va. 1990); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmts. e-f (1995) (stating that the advantage over others who
do not possess the trade secret need not be great and as long as the information remains
secret from others, not necessarily all, to whom it has "potential economic value," it
retains trade secret status); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.05[3], at 5-49 to
5-51; Peterson, supra note 41, at 416-17 (finding that "secrecy need not be absolute" for
the information to warrant protection).
63. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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companies in the field already aware of the information." Thus,
granting some measure of protection to Category 2 information is
necessary to strike a balance between information owners' interests in
maintaining their commercial advantages, employees' interests in
unrestricted movement between positions, and society's interests in
preserving commercial morality and promoting innovation.6 5
Accordingly, protection for Category 2 information is entirely
consistent with, and significantly furthers, the objectives of
confidentiality law.6
In sum, the foregoing analysis suggests that commercial information
should be afforded the following varying degrees of legal protection:
Category 1 information should be entitled to no legal protection;
Category 2 information should be entitled to a modicum of legal
protection; and Category 3 information should be entitled to the
greatest level of legal protection. This graduated scheme provides the
appropriate level of protection to each category of commercial
information in light of the fundamental policies confidentiality law
seeks to serve. 67
B. Historical Protection of Category 2 Information
Even without the benefit of a formally defined category of
protectable "confidential information" encompassing only Category 2
data, technology and know-how,68 courts historically have
safeguarded information that does not rise to the level of technical
"trade secrets" through a variety of legal theories-conversion, breach
of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair competition, unjust
enrichment, and conspiracy.7'
64. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
65. See Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 582-86, 598.
66. See id. at 606-08.
67. See supra notes 43-63 and accompanying text.
68. See infra Part II.B.1.
69. See "trade secret" definitions supra note 6 and infra note 122.
70. For a comprehensive discussion of all of the various legal theories available to
information owners, see 3 MILGRIM, supra note 20, § 13.03, at 13-34 to 13-55.
It is axiomatic that none of the theories described in this Part can properly be asserted
against an individual or company that acquires or learns of "confidential information"
through proper means. The comment to section 1 of the UTSA defines "proper means"
as follows:
(1) Discovery by independent invention;
(2) Discovery by "reverse engineering," that is, by starting with the known
product and working backward to find the method by which it was developed.
The acquisition of the known product must, of course, also be by a fair and
honest means, such as purchase of the item on the open market for reverse
854 [Vol. 29
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1. Breach of Contract
a. Express Contracts
Express contracts, whether in the form of covenants not to
compete or non-disclosure/confidentiality agreements," are
perhaps the most frequently employed devices for the protection
of proprietary information. 73  Presuming that such contracts
are supported by valid consideration 74 and are reasonable in
engineering to be lawful;
(3) Discovery under a license from the owner of the trade secret;
(4) Observation of the item in public use or on public display;
(5) Obtaining the trade secret from published literature.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, Commissioners' cmt., 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
71. A covenant not-to-compete, also known as a "restrictive covenant," is a promise
by an employee, after leaving the employ of the employer, to not engage in activities
that compete directly with those of his former employer. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
supra note 5, § 5.02[5]-[6], at 5-21.
72. A non-disclosure agreement is a promise by an employee that the employee will
not disclose any trade secrets or other confidential information that the employee
acquires during his or her employment. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, §
5.02, at 5-20 to 5-21.
73. See 3 MILGRIM, supra note 20, § 13.03, at 13-34; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra
note 5, § 5.02, at 5-20 to 5-22.
74. In the employment context, restrictive covenants ancillary to initial
employment contracts are almost always considered to be supported by consideration-
employment. See McClelland & Forgy, supra note 6, at 235. However, courts disagree
as to whether restrictive covenants entered into after the commencement of employment
need to be supported by independent consideration. Many courts support the position
that continued employment constitutes sufficient consideration for a covenant-not-to-
compete or a non-disclosure agreement; while other courts require something in addition
to the mere continuance of employment. Compare MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc.,
880 F.2d 286, 287-88 (10th Cir. 1989); Curtis 1000 v. Youngblade, 878 F. Supp. 1224,
1259 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Nestle Food Co. v. Miller, 836 F. Supp. 69, 77 (D.R.I. 1993);
Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1201, 1210
(D.N.H. 1992), aff'd, 968 F.2d 1463 (1st Cir. 1992); Jak Prods., Inc. v. Wiza, No. IP
92-110-C, 1992 WL 472277, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 11, 1992); Robert Half Int'l Inc. v.
Van Steenis, 784 F. Supp. 1263, 1273 (E.D. Mich. 1991); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v.
Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1338 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Hughes Assocs., Inc. v. Printed
Circuit Corp., 631 F. Supp. 851, 857 (N.D. Ala. 1986); Olin Water Servs. v. Midland
Research Labs., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 412, 415 (E.D. Ark. 1984), appeal dismissed, 774
F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1985); Mouldings, Inc. v. Potter, 315 F. Supp. 704, 713 (M.D. Ga.
1970), modified, 465 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1972); Mattison v. Johnston, 730 P.2d 286,
290 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Insurance Assocs. Corp. v. Hansen, 723 P.2d 190, 191-92
(Idaho Ct. App. 1986), with Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 946-47 (7th Cir.
1994); Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley Community Servs., Inc., 19 F.3d 359, 364 (7th
Cir. 1994); Admiral Servs., Inc. v. Drebit, No. Civ. A. 95-1086, 1995 WL 134812, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 1995); Herr v. McCormick Grain-The Heiman Co., 841 F. Supp.
1500, 1508 (D. Kan. 1994), affd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Herr v. Heiman, 75
F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1996) ; Nat'l Risk Management, Inc. v. Bramwell, 819 F. Supp.
417, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Scherer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 766 F. Supp. 593, 604 (N.D.
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scope," contracts prohibiting the unauthorized use of confidential
knowledge, even knowledge that fails to qualify for protection under
traditional trade secret law, have been found to be valid and
enforceable in virtually every jurisdiction.76 In fact, many courts have
III. 1991), aff'd, 975 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1992); Reiver v. Murdoch & Walsh, P.A., 625
F. Supp. 998, 1011 (D. Del. 1985); Haney v. Laub, 312 A.2d 330, 334 (Del. Super. Ct.
1973); Mid-Town Petroleum, Inc. v. Gowen, 611, N.E.2d 1221, 1227 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993); Maintenance Specialties, Inc. v. Gottus, 314 A.2d 279, 282 (Pa. 1974). For a
more detailed discussion of the continued employment consideration problem, see
Annotation, Sufficiency of Consideration for Employee's Covenant not to Compete,
Entered Into After Inception of Employment, 51 A.L.R.3d 825 (1973 and 1997 Supp.).
75. Each jurisdiction has its own unique rules pertaining to the "reasonableness" of
various restrictive covenants. Most jurisdictions, for example, require covenants-not-
to-compete to be limited in duration and geographical scope. See INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.02, at 5-21 to 5-22 (citing cases as examples); McClelland
& Forgy, supra note 6, at 234-35. Several states have legislation specifically
governing the enforcement of covenants-not-to-compete. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-1-1
(1975 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(2) (1973 & Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 542.33 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4 (1976 & Supp.
1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (West 1964 & Supp. 1998); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
§28.70 (4a)(1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-2 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1975);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15 §§ 217-219 (1971); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (1981 & Supp.
1996); S.D. LAWS 99 53-q-9 to 53-q-11 (1980 & Supp. 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
103.465 (West 1974 & Supp. 1995-96).
There is considerable disharmony, however, as to whether non-disclosure agreements
must be similarly limited. Compare AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202
(7th Cir. 1987); TDS Healthcare Sys. Corp. v. Humana Hosp. I11. Inc., 880 F. Supp.
1572, 1585 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Thomas v. Best Mfg. Corp., 218 S.E.2d 68, 71 (Ga.
1975); Cincinnati Tool Steel Co. v. Breed, 482 N.E.2d 170, 175 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985),
with Nordson Corp. v. Plasschaert, 674 F.2d 1371, 1377 (11th Cir. 1982); Altech, 765
F. Supp. at 1336-37; Salsbury Labs., Inc. v. Merieux Labs., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1545,
1551 (M.D. Ga. 1988); Sigma Chem. Co. v. Harris, 586 F. Supp. 704, 710 (E.D. Mo.
1984); Ackerman v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 778, 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), aff'd
in part, vacated in part, 652 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. 1995).
Further, courts of various jurisdictions disagree as to whether a confidentiality
agreement need list the particular information deemed confidential in order to be
enforceable. Compare Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 455 (8th Cir.
1987); Anacomp, Inc. v. Shell Knob Servs., Inc., No. 93 Civ. 4003 (PKL), 1994 WL
9681, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1994); Integrated Cash Management Servs., Inc. v.
Digital Transactions, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 370, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 920 F.2d 171
(2d Cir. 1990); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 393 N.E.2d 895, 901 (Mass.
1979); Eastern Marble Prods. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 799, 802
(Mass. 1977); Aries Info. Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Management Sys. Corp., 366 N.W.2d
366, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Schalk v. State of Texas, 823 S.W.2d 633, 643 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991), with Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 366 F.
Supp. 1173, 1185 (D. Ariz. 1973).
76. See, e.g., Eaton Corp. v. Giere, 971 F.2d 136, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1992);
Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d at 1199; Modem Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264,
1269 (8th Cir. 1978); Innovative Networks Inc. v. Satellite Airlines Ticketing Ctrs.,
Inc., 871 F. Supp. 709, 728-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Humana Hosp. Ill., Inc., 880 F. Supp.
at 1572; Anacomp, 1994 WL 9681, at *12; Ecolab Inc. v. Paolo, 753 F. Supp. 1100,
1113 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Salsbury Labs., Inc., 735 F. Supp. at 1545; Organic Chems.,
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noted that the use of express contracts to safeguard valuable
information is essential to advance the goals of confidentiality law.
7
b. Implied Contracts
In addition to express contracts, implied contracts78 have also been
found to limit an individual's or company's ability to use confidential
information. As its name suggests, a contract implied-in-fact is a de
facto agreement 79 between an information owner and another party.80
A contract implied-in-fact often is relied upon in the same sense as an
oral, express contract to protect confidential information.8
Inc. v. Carroll Prods., Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 628, 631-32 (W.D. Mich. 1981); USM
Corp., 393 N.E.2d at 895; see also e.g., Saliterman v. Finney, 361 N.W.2d 175, 177-78
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
77. One such court commented:
Often, the value of a firm is its special knowledge, and this knowledge may
not be an idea protectible by patent or copyright. If that firm cannot protect
that knowledge from immediate dissemination to competitors, it may not be
able to reap the benefits from the time and money invested in building that
knowledge. If firms are not permitted to construct a reasonable legal
mechanism to protect that knowledge, then the incentive to engage in the
building of such knowledge will be greatly reduced. Free riders will capture
this information at little or no cost and produce a product cheaper than the firm
which created the knowledge, because it will not have to carry the costs of
creating that knowledge in its pricing. Faced with this free rider problem, this
information may not be created, and thus everybody loses. To counteract that
problem, an employer can demand that employees sign an employment
agreement as a condition of their contract, and thus protect the confidential
information.
Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 561 (4th Cir.
1990).
78. There are two types of implied contracts: contracts implied-in-fact and contracts
implied-in-law. See 3 MILGRIM, supra note 20, § 13.03, at 13-36.
79. Implied-in-fact contracts include non-disclosure/confidentiality agreements and
agreements to pay for use.
80. An implied-in-fact contract can be defined as:
[a contract] not created or evidenced by the explicit agreement of the parties,
but inferred by the law, as a matter of reason and justice from their acts or
conduct, the circumstances surrounding the transaction making it a
reasonable, or even a necessary assumption that a contract existed between
them by tacit understanding.
Black's Law Dictionary 323 (6th ed. 1990).
81. See, e.g., Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193,
1196-97 (9th Cir. 1986); Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1984);
Airborne Data, Inc. v. United States, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 297, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Tele-Count Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 790, 793-94
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095, 1097 (N.Y.
1993); Oasis Music, Inc. v. 900 U.S.A., Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d 878, 881 (N.Y. 1994);
Schott v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 259 A.2d 443, 449 (Pa. 1969).
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Unlike contracts implied-in-fact, contracts implied-in-law do not
derive from the conduct or intentions of the parties. Rather, these
contracts arise from the judicial conclusion that disclosures made
within the context of certain relationships, such as employee-employer
or agent-principal, carry the implied contractual duty to not use the
disclosed information to the detriment of the discloser.82 Courts have
used contracts implied-in-law to protect a myriad of confidential
information that does not rise to the level of technical "trade secrets. 33
2. Interference with Contractual Relations
Different from, but often joined with, claims for breach of express
or implied contract are actions for tortious interference with contractual
relations. 84 Such actions typically are asserted against a third party
(generally a competing company) that knowingly and intentionally
entices an information owner's employees to breach their contractual
duties of confidentiality or loyalty.' Because express and implied-in-
fact contracts can protect commercially valuable knowledge that does
not constitute technical trade secrets,' tortious interference with
contractual relations claims further expand the scope of available legal
82. One court stated:
The courts recognize by the language of their opinions two classes of
implied contracts. The one class consists of those contracts which are
evidenced by the acts of the parties and not by their verbal or written word-
true contracts which rest upon an implied promise in fact. The second class
consists of contracts implied by the law where none in fact exist-quasi or
constructive contracts created by law and not by the intentions of the parties.
In truth, [a contract implied-in-law] is not a contract or promise at all. It is
an obligation which the law creates . . . . Duty, and not a promise or
agreement or intention of the person sought to be charged, defines it. It is
fictitiously deemed contractual, in order to fit the cause of action to the
contractual remedy.
Miller v. Schloss, 113 N.E. 337, 338-39 (N.Y. 1916); see also Airborne Data, Inc., 217
U.S.P.Q. at 297.
83. See, e.g., In re Uniservices, Inc., 517 F.2d 492, 497 (7th Cir. 1975); Anacomp,
Inc. v. Shell Knob Servs., Inc., No. 93 Civ. 4003 (PKL), 1994 WL 9681, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1994); Prudential Ind. Co. of America v. Crouch, 606 F. Supp. 464,
469-70 (S.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1986); Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v.
Crampton, 174 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 272, 274 (Mass. 1972).
84. See 3 MILGRIM, supra note 20, § 13.03, at 13-37.
85. See, e.g., InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989);
American Air Filter Co. v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1975); Innovative
Networks, Inc. v. Satellite Airlines Ticketing Ctrs., Inc., No. 92 Civ. 2408 (SWK),
1995 WL 3972, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 4, 1995); Walt Peabody Adver. Serv., Inc. v.
Pecora, 393 F. Supp. 328, 330-33 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc. v.
Koering, 404 N.W.2d 301, 304-06 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
86. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
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protection for confidential information.r
3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
In addition to any specific contractual non-disclosure or non-
competition obligations, individuals and/or companies may be bound
to maintain the strict confidence of certain information by virtue of
their fiduciary relationships with the information's owner. 8 Indeed,
breach of fiduciary duty claims-claims that may be subdivided into
actions for breach of confidence and actions for breach of loyalty-
may be the basis for damages and/or injunctive relief despite the
absence of any specific "trade secret" wrongdoing.Is
87. See, e.g., Smithfield Ham and Prods. Co. v. Portion Pac, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 346,
349-50 (E.D. Va. 1995); ITT Schadow Inc. v. Stein, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1348, 1351 (D.
Minn. 1988).
Closely related, but distinct from, actions for intentional interference with contractual
relations are claims for inducement of breach of duty. Inducement claims may arise
where a third party knowingly and intentionally entices an information owner's
employees or agents to breach their common-law, fiduciary duties of confidentiality
and/or loyalty-duties that shall be detailed in the next subsection. See Northwest
Airlines v. American Airlines, 853 F. Supp. 1110, I117 (D. Minn. 1994); BIEC Int'l,
Inc. v. Global Steel Services, Ltd., 791 F. Supp. 489, 537-48 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Houston
Oil & Minerals Corp. v. SEEC, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 990, 991 (W.D. La. 1985); Mixing
Equip. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
modified, 436 F.2d 1308 (3d Cir. 1971); 205 Corp. v. Brandow, 517 N.W.2d 548, 551
(Iowa 1994); Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 446 S.E.2d 648, 657-58 (W.Va. 1994).
88. See 3 MILGRIM, supra note 20, §13.03, at 13-53.
89. Both types of breach of fiduciary duty claim have their roots in section 757 of the
Restatement (First) of Torts. The First Restatement established liability for persons
who use or disclose information received in a confidential relationship or learned from a
third-party with notice that the information was secret and that the information was
improperly acquired or revealed in the first instance. Comment j to section 757 states:
A breach of confidence under the rule stated in this Clause [section 757(b)]
may also be a breach of contract which subjects the actor to liability under the
rules state in the Restatement of Contracts. But whether or not there is a
breach of contract, the rule stated in this Section subjects the actor to liability
if his disclosure or use of another's trade secret is a breach of the confidence
reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret in him.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. j (1939).
The new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition also addresses liability for breach
of a duty of confidentiality generally and breach of an employee's confidentiality
obligations specifically. Section 41 of the Third Restatement provides that a duty of
confidence is created when:
(a) the person made an express promise of confidentiality prior to the
disclosure of the trade secret; or
(b) the trade secret was disclosed to the person under circumstances in which
the relationship between the parties to the disclosure or the other facts
surrounding the disclosure justify the conclusions that, at the time of the
disclosure,
(1) the person knew or had reason to know that the disclosure was
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a. Breach of Confidence
Where an information owner discloses in confidence its valuable,
non-public information to an otherwise unaffiliated third party,90 the
disclosee may be legally obligated to hold that information in strictest
confidence. Under such circumstances, it is the disclosure itself that
creates a confidential (or fiduciary) relationship. 9 Further, the specific
information's failure to qualify as a "trade secret" does not excuse or
justify a disclosee's disregard of its confidentiality obligations. 92
b. Breach of Loyalty or Trust
Even more stringent than the duties of confidentiality imposed upon
third-party recipients of advantageous commercial information are the
strict fiduciary obligations imposed on employees, agents, directors
and officers that prohibit them from using or disclosing for their own
advantage (or to the detriment of their employers, principals and
companies) confidential information imparted to them in the course of
intended to be in confidence, and
(2) the other party to the disclosure was reasonable in inferring that the
person consented to an obligation of confidentiality.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 (1995).
90. This is a common occurrence in the negotiation and execution of mergers, joint-
ventures, licenses, vendor contracts, and subcontractor agreements.
91. See, e.g., Phillips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623, 632 (5th Cir. 1994); Computer Assocs.
Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 717 (2d Cir. 1992); A.L. Labs., Inc. v. Philips
Roxane, Inc., 803 F.2d 378, 381-83 (8th Cir. 1986); Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v.
Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1200-04 (5th Cir. 1986); Goldberg v. Medtronic, Inc.,
686 F.2d 1219, 1223-29 (7th Cir. 1982); Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d
976, 983-84 (7th Cir. 1978); Cloud v. Standard Packaging Corp., 376 F.2d 384, 388-89
(7th Cir. 1967); Copley v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 93, 97 (S.D.
W.Va. 1968); Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 159, 167 (D. Conn. 1951),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951); Howard Schultz & Assocs., Inc.
v. Broniec, 236 S.E.2d 265, 267 (Ga. 1977); Meyers v. Waverly Fabrics, 489 N.Y.S.2d
891, 894 n.2 (1985); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 769 (Tex. 1958);
Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 673-74 (Wash. 1987).
92. One court commented:
[A]n item may be considered confidential in the context of a business
relationship without rising to the level of a trade secret. A confidential
relationship is distinguished by the expectations of the parties involved,
while a trade secret is identified through rigorous examination of the
information sought to be protected.
Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441, 1456 (11 th Cir. 1991) (citations
omitted); see also Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462,
466-67 (9th Cir. 1990); Sandlin v. Johnson, 152 F.2d 8, 11 (8th Cir. 1945); Editions
Play Bac, S.A. v. Western Publ'g Co., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1338, 1343-44 (S.D.N.Y.
1993); Neil and Spencer Holdings Ltd. v. Kleen-Rite, Inc., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 350,
355 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Crocan Corp. v. Sheller-Globe Corp., 385 F. Supp. 251, 254
(N.D. I11. 1974).
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their duties.93 These fiduciary obligations are a function of, and are
attendant to, employees', agents', directors' and officers' fundamental
duties of trust and loyalty; these obligations do not depend solely on
the confidential disclosure of non-public knowledge for their
existence. 94 'Courts repeatedly have found employees and other
93. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sipula, 776 F.2d 157, 163-64 (7th Cir. 1985),
aff'd 796 F.2d 417 (1986); Molex, Inc. v. Nolen, 759 F.2d 474, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1985);
NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 749 F.2d 247, 253-54 (5th Cir. 1985); Uniservices, Inc. v.
Dudenhoffer, 517 F.2d 492, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d
369, 377-78 (7th Cir. 1953); Advanced Power Sys., Inc. v. Hi-Tech Sys., Inc., 801 F.
Supp. 1450, 1455 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 935-
36 (Cal. 1966); By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 329 P.2d 147, 151 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1958); Kaufman v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 470 N.Y.S.2d 720, 723 (App. Div.
1983), affd, 61 N.Y.2d 930 (1984); Forrest Paschal Mach. Co. v. Milholen, 220 S.E.2d
190, 197 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); Classic Instruments, Inc. v. VDO-Argo Instruments,
Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 894, 904 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
94. As one court specifically noted:
An employee is a fiduciary with respect to the information which comes to
him in the course of his employment. He must exercise the utmost good faith,
loyalty and honesty towards his employer whether coupled with an interest or
not, and whether the compensation is small or large. The duty to be faithful
does not cease when the employment ends. He has a duty not to reveal
confidential information obtained through his employment, and not to use
such confidential information after he has left his employment. Even where
the contract of employment does not prohibit an employee from engaging in
competitive businesses after the termination of his employment, there is a
restraint that he may not use "confidential information or trade secrets
obtained from the former employer, appropriating, in effect, to his
competitive advantage what rightfully belongs to his employer."
Bull v. Logetronics, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 115, 132-33 (E.D. Va. 1971) (quoting
Community Counselling Service v. Reilly, 317 F.2d 239, 244 (4th Cir. 1963)). The
duty of an employee, agent, or other fiduciary to refrain from using or disclosing
confidential information acquired in the course of his or her duties has its roots in
sections 395 and 396 of the Second Restatement of Agency. Section 395 provides:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to
use or to communicate information confidentially given him by the principal
or acquired by him during the course of or on account of his agency or in
violation of his duties as agent, in competition with or to the injury of the
principal, on his own account or on behalf of another, although such
information does not relate to the transaction in which he is then employed,
unless the information is a matter of general knowledge.
Section 396 states:
Unless otherwise agreed, after the termination of the agency, the agent:
has a duty to the principal not to use or to disclose to third persons, on his
own account or on account of others, in competition with the principal or to
his injury, trade secrets, written lists of names, or other similar confidential
matters given to him only for the principal's use or acquired by the agent in
violation of duty.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 395, 396 (1958); see NCH Corp, 749 F.2d at 254;
Nucor Corp. v. Tenn. Forging Steel Serv., Inc., 476 F.2d 386, 392 (8th Cir. 1973);
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fiduciaries liable for breach of loyalty and trust for the unauthorized
dissemination of confidential information that does not rise to the level
of "trade secrets." 95
4. Unfair Competition
Another commonly utilized theory for the protection of confidential
information is "unfair competition., 96  The doctrine of unfair
competition has its roots in both common law and in section 759 of the
First Restatement of Torts. 97 The doctrine contemplates liability
Tlapek v. Chevron Oil Co., 407 F.2d 1129, 1134 (8th Cir. 1969); Tan-Line Studios,
Inc. v. Bradley, I U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2032, 2039-40 (E.D. Pa.), affd sub nom. Paul v.
Tanning, Health & Fitness Equip. Co., 808 F.2d 1517 (3d Cir.), and affd sub nom. Tan-
Line Sun Studios, Inc. v. Paul, 808 F.2d 1518 (3d Cir. 1986); Organic Chems., Inc. v.
Carrol Prods., Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 628, 631 (W.D. Mich. 1981); TIE Sys., Inc., v.
Telcom Midwest, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 1080, 1085 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Defcon, Inc. v.
Webb, 687 So.2d 639, 642-43 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Bellboy Seafood Corp. v.
Nathanson, 410 N.W.2d 349, 352-53 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
95. See, e.g., Eaton Corp. v. Giere, 971 F.2d 136, 141 (8th Cir. 1992); Lehman v.
Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285, 298 (2d Cir. 1986); Nucor Corp., 476 F.2d at 392;
Tlapek, 407 F.2d at 1133-34; American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 261 F.2d 652, 655
(2d Cir. 1958); Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953); Coulter Corp. v.
Leinert, 869 F. Supp. 732, 734-35 (E.D. Mo. 1994); Anacomp, Inc. v. Shell Knob
Servs., Inc., No. 93 Civ. 4003 (PLL), 1994 WL 9681, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10,
1994); Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 805 F. Supp. 1312, 1321 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 21 F.3d 568 (4th Cir. 1994); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc., Civ. A. No. CV 92-1654-R, 1992 WL 159803, at *18 (C.D. Cal. April 14, 1992),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Salsbury Labs., Inc. v. Merieux
Labs., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1545, 1552-53 (M.D. Ga. 1988); Tan-Line Studios, I
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2039; Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Crouch, 606 F. Supp. 464,
471-72 (S.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1986); Abraham Zion Corp. v.
Lebow, 593 F. Supp. 551, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd 761 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1985);
Wesley-Jessen, Inc. v. Armento, 519 F. Supp. 1352, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Organic
Chems., 211 U.S.P.Q. at 631-32; Bull, 323 F. Supp. at 132-33; Standard Brands, Inc. v.
Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 262-63 (E.D. La. 1967); Components for Research, Inc. v.
Isolation Prods., Inc., 241 Cal. App. 2d 726, 729, 50 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App.
1966); Conant v. Karris, 520 N.E.2d 757, 762 (II1. App. Ct. 1987); Comedy Cottage,
Inc. v. Berk, 495 N.E.2d 1006, 1011-12 (II1. App. Ct. 1986); Saliterman v. Finney, 361
N.W.2d 175, 178-79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); see also, I MILGRIM, supra note 20, § 4.03
("There can be no betrayal of a confidential relationship if a trade secret has not been
imparted, or at least the information imparted is not generally available, although not
technically a trade secret.").
96. See INTELLEcTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.02, at 5-17.
97. Section 759 of the Restatement (First) of Torts states as follows: "One who, for
the purpose of advancing a rival business interest, procures by improper means
information about another's business is liable to the other for the harm caused by his
possession, disclosure or use of the information." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759
(1939). Comment b to section 759 states that the rule "applies to information about
one's business whether or not it constitutes a trade secret ... ." Id. § 759 cmt. b.
As to the types of "improper means" contemplated by this rule, comment c to section
759 refers to "theft, trespass, bribing or otherwise inducing employers or others to
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against those individuals who obtain or learn of confidential
information by improper means for the purpose of advancing a rival
business interest. ' The essence of a claim for unfair competition is
"the taking and use of [a] plaintiff's property to compete against the
plaintiff's own use of the same property." 99 Thus, the law of unfair
competition is broad enough to disallow the unauthorized acquisition
and use of information that does not necessarily constitute a "trade
secret. '' "O
reveal the information in breach of duty, fraudulent misrepresentations, threats of harm
by unlawful conduct, wire tapping, procuring one's own employees or agents to become
employees of the other for purposes of espionage and so forth." Id. § 759 cmt. c. It is
clear from this list of "improper means" that claims for unfair competition under section
759 often encompass claims for breach of confidence, breach of loyalty, tortious
interference with contract, etc. See Kitch, supra note 48, at 661.
98. See American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 662 (2d
Cir. 1979); TDS Healthcare Sys. Corp. v. Humana Hosp. Ill., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1572,
1584-85 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Anacomp, Inc. v. Shell Knob Servs., Inc., No. 93 Civ. 4003
(PKL), 1994 WL 9681, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1994).
"Unfair competition is not a tort with specific elements; it describes a general
category of torts which courts recognize for the protection of commercial interests."
Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc. v. Koering, 404 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL. ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 130, at 1015 (5th ed.
1984)).
99. Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
672 F.2d 1095, 1105 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Computer
Automation, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 424, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that the "essence" of
an unfair competition claim under New York common law is "the bad faith
misappropriation of the labor and expenditures of another, likely to cause confusion or
to deceive purchasers as to the origin of goods"); Advanced Magnification Instruments,
Ltd. v. Minuteman Optical Corp., 522 N.Y.S.2d 287, 290 (App. Div. 1987) ("An
employee's illegal physical taking or copying of an employer's files or confidential
information constitutes actionable unfair competition.").
As expressed by the court in E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. v. Christopher, "industrial
espionage . . . has become a popular sport in some segments of our industrial
community. However, our devotion to free wheeling industrial competition must not
force us into accepting the law of the jungle as the standard of morality expected in our
commercial relations." E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012,
1016 (5th Cir. 1970).
100. As one court explained:
Although at one time the law of unfair competition was limited to claims that
one party had attempted to pass off his goods as those of another party, unfair
competition is now held to encompass a broader range of unfair practices
which may be generally described as a misappropriation of the skill,
expenditures, and labor of another.
American Footwear Corp., 609 F.2d at 662 (citing Flexitzed Inc. v. Nat'l Flextized
Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 781 (2d Cir. 1964)). "[Elven where the information would not
otherwise qualify as a trade secret, the unauthorized physical taking and exploitation of
internal company documents ... by an employee for use in his future business or
employment is to be enjoined as unfair competition." Ecolab Inc. v. Paolo, 753 F.
Supp. 1100, 1111 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Advanced Magnification Instruments, 522
N.Y.S.2d 287); Anacomp, Inc., 1994 WL 9681, at *13 (citations omitted); see also Self
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5. Fraud and Misrepresentation
Another doctrine used to protect confidential information is the
common-law prohibition of fraud and misrepresentation. Courts
frequently impose liability on individuals and businesses who, through
material misstatements or omissions, induce information owners to
reveal their valuable, non-public knowledge.'' The duty to refrain
from engaging in fraud and misrepresentation is independent of the
duties of confidentiality created by law and by contract." 2 Moreover,
fraudulently-acquired information need not attain formal legal status as
a "trade secret" to support a fraud or misrepresentation claim) °3
6. Conversion
There is little doubt that a person or corporation who takes tangible
property that includes confidential information may be liable for
conversion.) °4 Further, that person or corporation may also be liable
for wrongful conversion of the confidential information itself. 0 5
Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466-67 (9th Cir. 1990);
SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1264-65 (3d Cir. 1985); TDS
Healthcare Sys. Corp., 880 F. Supp. at 1584 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Innovative Networks,
Inc. v. Satellite Airlines Ticketing Ctrs., Inc., No. 92 Civ. 2408 (SWK), 1995 WL
3972, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 4, 1995); Jensen Tools, Inc. v. Contact E., Inc., Civ. A. No.
92-10970-Z, 1992 WL 245693, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 1992); Micro Display Sys.,
Inc. v. Axtel, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 202, 204-05 (D. Minn. 1988); Continental Data Sys.,
Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 1986 WL 20432, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1986); Crocan Corp. v.
Sheller-Globe Corp., 385 F. Supp. 251, 254 (N.D. II!. 1974); Continental Dynamics
Corp. v. Kanter, 408 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (App. Div. 1978); Den-tal-ez, Inc. v. Siemens
Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1230-31 (Pa. Super. 1989).
101. See, e.g., Computer Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1365,
1372-73 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1984); Crocan Corp., 385 F.
Supp. at 253-55; Den-tal-ez, 566 A.2d at 1230-31.
102. See Micro Display Sys., 699 F. Supp. at 203-05; Crocan Corp., 385 F. Supp. at
254-55; Den-tal-ez, 566 A.2d at 1231.
103. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 393 (2d Cir. 1966); Bloom
v. Hennepin County, 783 F. Supp. 418, 440-41 (D. Minn. 1992); ITT Schadow Inc. v.
Stein, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1348, 1351 (D. Minn. 1988).
The tort of conversion consists of "'a distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over
another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his title or rights therein,
... without the owner's consent and without lawful justification."' Moore v. Regents of
Univ., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 503 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting 18 AM. JUR. 2D, Conversion,
§ 1, at 145-46 (1985)), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
105. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 915 F.2d 300, 304-05 (7th
Cir. 1990); Advanced Power Sys., Inc. v. Hi-Tech Sys., Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1450, 1458
(E.D. Pa. 1992); Bloom, 783 F. Supp. at 439-40; Micro Display Sys., 699 F. Supp. at
203-04 (D. Minn. 1988); Nat'l Surety Corp. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 418 So.2d 847, 849-
50 (Ala. 1982); Annis v. Tomberlin & Shelnutt Assocs., 392 S.E.2d 717, 723 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1990); Conant v. Karris, 520 N.E.2d 757, 763 (I11. App. Ct. 1987); Datacomm
Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 185, 194-95 (Mass. 1986); Tennant
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While historically it was thought that property in a purely intangible
form (such as confidential business information) could not be the
subject of an action for conversion or trover,!10 recently, this notion
has been changed. 1" The Supreme Court stated that "[c]onfidential
information acquired or compiled by a corporation in the course.., of
its business is ... property to which the corporation has the exclusive
right and benefit, and which a court of equity will protect through the
injunctive process or other appropriate remedy."' ° Thus, conversion
actions afford information owners yet another mechanism with which
to protect their competitively advantageous, confidential
information.'0 9
7. Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust
Where a fiduciary wrongfully uses or otherwise misappropriates an
owner's valuable confidential information, the wrongdoer may be
required to forfeit the benefits he improperly obtained. Thus, the
fiduciary may be required to forfeit the full amount of his "unjust
Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 355 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Cf.
Kendall/Hunt Publ'g Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 247 (Iowa 1988).
106. See Miles, Inc. v. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 810 F. Supp. 1091, 1094
(S.D. Cal. 1993); ITT Schadow Inc, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1351; Freedman v. Beneficial Corp.,
406 F. Supp. 917, 921 n.6 (D. Del. 1975); Olschewski v. Hudson, 262 P. 43, 45 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1927).
107. One commentator notes:
[The] conception that an action for conversion lies only for tangible property
capable of being identified and taken into actual possession is based on a
fiction on which the action of trover was founded-namely, that the defendant
had found the property of another which was lost-and that such conception
has become, in the progress of law, an unmeaning thing which has been
discarded by most courts ....
FMC Corp., 915 F.2d at 304-05 (quoting Annotation, Nature of Property or Rights
Other than Tangible Chattels Which May Be Subject of Conversion, 44 A.L.R.2d 927,
929 (1955)).
108. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (quoting 3 WILLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 857.10, at 260
(perm. ed. rev. vol. 1994) (footnote omitted)); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that trade secrets may be protected as property
under the taking clause of the fifth amendment).
109. For purposes of the UTSA preemption analysis contained infra Part V,
conversion claims may be divided into actions for "conversion of tangible property,"
those in which a defendant actually takes property embodying or containing
confidential information, and actions for "conversion of invention", those in which a
defendant merely takes and/or improperly utilizes the intangible, confidential
information itself). See 3 MILGRIM, supra note 20, § 13.03[21[c].
An action for breach of bailment may also be available to information owners. When
"tangible property in which a trade secret is embodied is bailed by the owner, the bailee
(such as an independent contractor) is under a fiduciary obligation not to wrongfully use
the tangible object of the bailment to the owner's detriment." Id.
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enrichment."" 0
Often coupled with actions for "unjust enrichment" are claims for
the imposition of constructive trusts.' Significantly, a constructive
trust may be imposed upon the tangible profits and property acquired
as a result of the breach of fiduciary duty, as well as on the profits or
property actually obtained.'
2
8. Conspiracy
As a general rule, the law does not recognize civil conspiracy as a
distinct, substantive tort." 3 However, courts often permit plaintiffs
alleging conspiracy to show that a series of tortious acts relating to the
misappropriation of confidential information flowed from a common
scheme or plan." 4 Thus, courts may allow a plaintiff to connect
multiple defendants to an actionable breach of contract, breach of
confidence, breach of loyalty, fraud or other act of unfair competition,
notwithstanding that the defendant may not have directly violated a
fiduciary duty." 5 By so establishing joint liability for co-conspirators,
110. See, e.g., Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d
556, 560 (4th Cir. 1990); Sikes v. McGraw-Edison Co., 665 F.2d 731, 736 (5th Cir.
1982); Servo Corp. of Am. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716, 725 (4th Cir. 1964); Avtec
Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 805 F. Supp. 1312, 1322-23 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd in part, vacated
in part, 21 F.3d 568 (4th Cir. 1994); Sheridan v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1347,
1352 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); Robert B. Vance & Assocs., Inc. v. Baronet Corp., 487 F. Supp.
790, 800 (N.D. Ga. 1979); B&Y Metal Painting, Inc. v. Ball, 279 N.W.2d 813, 817
(Minn. 1979); Schott v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 259 A.2d 443, 448 (Pa. 1969);
Chandler v. Mastercraft Dental Corp., 739 S.W.2d 460, 469 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
I. See 3 MILGRIM, supra note 20, § 13.03[2][a].
112. Many courts have held that "[wihere a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the
beneficiary acquires property through the use of confidential information, he holds the
property so acquired upon a constructive trust to the beneficiary." Tlapek v. Chevron
Oil Co., 407 F.2d 1129, 1134 (8th Cir. 1969) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §
200 (1937)); see also, Eden Hannon, 914 F.2d at 560-61; ABKCO Music, Inc. v.
Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 996 (2d Cir. 1983); Tenneco Oil Co. v. Joiner,
696 F.2d 768, 775-76 (10th Cir. 1982); Funchion v. Somerset Knitting Co., 158 F.
Supp. 57, 62-63 (M.D.N.C. 1958); By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 329
P.2d 147, 151 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958); Hill v. Names & Addresses, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 1085,
1096 (Il. App. Ct. 1991); Cornale v. Stewart Stamping Corp., 129 N.Y.S.2d 808, 814
(App. Div. 1954); Rosenblum v. Judson Eng'g Corp., 109 A.2d 558, 562-63 (N.H.
1954).
113. See, e.g., Innovative Networks, Inc. v. Satellite Airlines Ticketing Ctrs., Inc.,
871 F. Supp. 709, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Advanced Power Sys., Inc. v. Hi-Tech Sys.,
Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1450, 1458 (E.D. Pa. 1992); S & D Foods, Inc. v. Consol. Pet Foods,
Inc., 144 B.R. 121, 167 (D. Col. 1992); Micro Display Sys., Inc. v. Axtel, Inc., 699 F.
Supp. 202, 203-04 (D. Minn. 1988); Commodity Credit Corp. v. Transit Grain Co., 157
F. Supp. 527, 538 (S.D. Tex. 1957); S. Cal. Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin, 7 Cal. Rptr.
43, 54 (Ct. App. 1960); Fox v. Wilson, 354 S.E.2d 737, 742-43 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
114. See cases cited supra note 113.
115. See supra notes 68-87, 90-114.
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conspiracy claims often expand the reach of tort and contract protection
for valuable, confidential information." 6
III. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE CURRENT TWO-TIERED SYSTEM
Recognizing the need for a framework with which courts can
identify, and differentiate between, legally protectable and
unprotectable information, yet emphasizing the need for simplicity,
many courts and commentators assert that all commercially valuable,
proprietary information, including both Category 2 and Category 3
information, should be defined and protected as "trade secrets.""' 7
According to these courts and commentators, establishing a single
category of legally protectable information promotes uniformity
because a solitary set of standards which can be applied in all cases
and to all forms of technical data or business knowledge is created." 8
Further, advocates contend that in a commercial world in which only
two spheres of information-"general skill and knowledge" and "trade
secrets"-exist, businesses will be able more readily to determine
which of their methods and technologies are entitled to legal protection;
employees will be able more easily to ascertain what skills and know-
how learned from their employers they may take with them to new
jobs; and competitors will be able more accurately to assess the limits
of their potential liability for obtaining competitively valuable
information from their rivals." 9 The First Restatement, the UTSA and
1 16. In addition to conspiracy liability, defendants also may be jointly and severally
liable for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty or unfair competition by virtue of
an agent-principal relationship. For example, where an employee breaches his
contractual, common-law or fiduciary confidentiality obligations to a former employer
while employed by, or at the direction of, a subsequent corporate employer, that
employee may be deemed to have acted as an agent of the corporate employer. In that
case, the corporate employer may be liable for the damages resulting from the
employee's improper breach. See, e.g., Olin Hunt Specialty Prods., Inc. v. Advanced
Delivery & Chem. Sys., No. 88 C 20364, 1991 WL 294970, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 9,
1991); Koehring Co. v. E.D. Etnyre & Co., 254 F. Supp. 334, 362 (N.D. II1. 1966);
Conant v. Karris, 520 N.E.2d 757, 762 (Il1. App. 1987); Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds
& Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 90-91 (Minn. 1979); Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach.,
Co., 355 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
117. See Kitch, supra note 48, at 663-64; Neufeld, supra note 44, at 916-922; Pace,
supra note 2, at 445-49.
118. As one commentator stated:
One consequence of this expansion [in the definition of trade secrets] is that
the conceptual structure of the law is simplified. Now instead of one set of
rules for the protection of trade secrets, another for the protection of
confidential information from business rivals, and yet a third applicable to
idea submitters, all are handled under a single rubric: trade secrecy law.
Kitch, supra note 48, at 663.
119. See Feldman, supra note 6, at 170-01; Kitch, supra note 48, at 663; Neufeld,
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the Third Restatement all accept and attempt to implement this "two-
tiered" approach to the protection of commercial knowledge-an
approach in which information is classified only as either a protected
"trade secret" or unprotected "general skill-and knowledge."'' 2
A. Difficulties in Determining Whether Category 2 Information Is
Protected
Protecting both Category 2 and Category 3 information as "trade
secrets" appears to be theoretically sound. In practice, however, the
ambiguities inherent in various definitions of "trade secrets" makes it
very difficult, if not impossible, for businesses and their employees to
predict whether Category 2 information will qualify for legal
protection.' 2' The First Restatement, the UTSA, and the new Third
Restatement all afford trade secret protection only to information that is
supra note 44, at 916-922; Pace, supra note 2, at 445-49.
120. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39, 41 (1995); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 438
(1990).
Comment c to section 41 of the Third Restatement reveals that although the Third
Restatement provides increased protection for various forms of commercial information,
it effectively maintains a two-tiered protective system:
Some courts have recognized liability in tort for the unauthorized disclosure of
confidential business information found to be ineligible for protection as a
trade secret. In some cases the claim is designated as one for "breach of
confidence," while in others it is described as one for "unfair competition."
Many of these cases rest on a narrow definition of "trade secret" that excludes
non-technical information such as customer identities or information that is
not subject to continuous, long-term use. Such information is now subsumed
under the broader definition of "trade secret" adopted in [section] 39. In other
cases the imposition of liability for breach of confidence may be justified by
interests other than the protection of valuable commercial information, such
as the interests that prompt recognition of the general duty of loyalty owed by
an employee to an employer... or the special duties of confidence owed in
particular relationships such as attorney and client or doctor and patient.
However, in the absence of interests justifying broader duties, the plaintiff
should be required to demonstrate that the information qualifies for protection
as a trade secret under the rule stated in [section] 39. The recognition of more
extensive rights against the use or disclosure of commercial information can
restrict access to knowledge that is properly regarded as part of the public
domain.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPEITION § 41 cmt. c (1995); see also Kitch, supra
note 48, at 662-63 (explaining how the UTSA and the Restatement of Unfair
Competition have eliminated the difference between trade secrets and other confidential
information and included all secret information of economic value within the definition
of trade secrets).
121. See Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 596-602; Feldman, supra note 6, at
170-71; Samuels & Johnson, supra note 2, at 50-52; Neufeld, supra note 44, at 918.
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"not generally known" in the relevant trade or business. 2 2 However,
the phrase "not generally known" is not specifically defined in any of
these legal authorities."2
What is clear from the courts' application of the "not generally
known" requirement, however, is that at some indefinite point along
the continuum between absolute secrecy and universal knowledge,
commercially valuable information loses its status as a "trade secret"
and becomes unprotected "general skill and knowledge.' ' 124 Some
122. The First Restatement provides that "[a] trade secret may consist of any formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or
use it." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). The First Restatement
asserts that "[a]n exact definition of a trade secret is not possible." Id. It suggests the
following six factors for courts to consider in determining whether 'particular
information constitutes a trade secret:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2)
the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his
business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the
information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the
information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be
properly acquired or duplicated by others.
Id. The First Restatement makes clear that, "[miatters of public knowledge or of general
knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by one as his secret." Id.
The UTSA defines trade secret as essentially any information that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 463 (1990).
The Third Restatement takes a more expansive view and defines a trade secret as "any
information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over
others." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). Yet, the comments
to the Third Restatement note that, "[i]nformation that is generally known or readily
ascertainable through proper means . . . by others to whom it has potential economic
value is not protectable as a trade secret." Id. cmt. f.
123. See supra note 122.
124. See Jostens, Inc. v. Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 698 (Minn.
1982); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.05, at 5-49 to 5-51; 1 MILGRIM, supra
note 20, § 1.07, at 1-308 to 1-323; Burk, supra note 5, at 149-50; Davidson & DeMay,
supra note 5, at 601-02; Peterson, supra note 41, at 429-30; Samuels & Johnson, supra
note 2, at 69-72.
One commentator describes the diminishing nature of a "trade secret" as follows:
Adopting the relative view, one might conceptualize a trade secret as a sand
castle. At low tide, the castle stands strong and unmarred. As dusk approaches
and the tide rises, fingers of water set upon the castle, and slowly wash away
its outer walls until the castle founders. At sometime during dusk our castle,
the trade secret, ceases to have an independent distinct existence and becomes
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courts define this point where a majority of persons in industry are
aware of the information. 25 Others subscribe to the view that
information is entitled to trade secret protection so long as the
information affords its owner an advantage over even a single
competitor who does not possess it.'26
B. The Problems Created by the Ambiguous "Not Generally Known"
Standard
The ambiguity inherent in the "not generally known" requirement
for trade secret status is fundamentally undesirable for two principal
reasons. First, at worst, courts adopting a restrictive definition of "not
generally known"'127 leave valuable Category 2 information entirely
unprotected."2 Such an absence of legal protection creates incentives
for businesses to acquire quickly and/or cheaply Category 2
information from their rivals, rather than to engage in potentially
difficult, time-consuming, and expensive independent development
efforts. Further, it discourages innovation with respect to methods
and machines which, while unquestionably useful, are not truly novel
or unique; companies could not be assured that such innovation would
yield short and/or long-term competitive benefits vis-a-vis rivals who
could "steal" the information at little or no cost.' 29
Secondly, the ambiguity created by the "not generally known"
requirement is undesirable because, at best, such ambiguity raises the
costs of innovation. 3 ' Businesses committed to improving and
refining their technology, but unsure as to whether "trade secret" law
will protect independently-derived Category 2 information, are forced
to employ expensive "self-help" measures to assure that their
and indistinguishable heap of sand.
1 MILGRIM, supra note 20, §1.07, at 1-320.
125. See, e.g., TGC Corp. v. HTM Sports, B.V., 896 F. Supp. 751, 759-60 (E.D.
Tenn. 1995); AMP Inc. v. Fleischacker, No. 84 C 1676, 1986 WL 3598, at *18 (N.D.
I11. Mar. 18, 1986), affd 823 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1987); Wilson Certified Foods, Inc. v.
Fairbury Food Prods., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 1081, 1083-85 (D. Neb. 1974); Midland-Ross
Corp. v. Yokana, 185 F. Supp. 594, 603 (D.N.J. 1960), aff'd, 293 F.2d 411 (3d Cir.
1961); MBL (USA) Corp. v. Diekman, 445 N.E.2d 418, 425 (I11. App. Ct. 1983).
126. See Vendo Co. v. Long, 102 S.E.2d 173, 175 (Ga. 1958); Wilson v. Barton &
Ludwig Inc., 296 S.E.2d 74, 75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel, 385
N.E.2d 1055, 1056-57 (N.Y. 1978); see Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 652-53.
127. That is, courts who decline to afford trade secret status to commercial
information that is known either to a simple majority (i.e. 51% or more) or a substantial
majority (i.e. roughly 65% to 85%) of persons in the relevant field.
128. See cases cited supra note 62.
129. See Pace, supra note 2, at 438-39.
130. See Pace, supra note 2, at 447; Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 644-45.
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commercially valuable "know-how" is not acquired by competitors.
As previously discussed,' 3' forced reliance on "self-help" measures
increases the level of investment required for profitable innovation.' 32
Consequently, this allocation of funds reduces both the incentives and
the resources available for product and process development.
C. The Inadequacy of Only One Category of Protectable Information
In addition to the predictability problems associated with current
"trade secret" definitions, the maintenance of only one category of
legally protectable information -"trade secrets"-is theoretically
unsatisfactory, because lumping together all proprietary knowledge
effectively ignores the essential differences between Category 2 and
Category 3 information. As previously indicated, Category 2
information is qualitatively different from Category 3 information. 33
Yet, both Category 2 and Category 3 information are worthy of legal
protection because both categories of information afford their owners
competitive advantages over rivals who do not actually possess such
information and who might seek to "obtain" (rather than to develop)
that information in the absence of legal barriers. 34  Thus, while
13 1. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
132. The ambiguity inherent in the "not generally known" requirement for trade
secret protection is further exacerbated by the "relative secrecy" doctrine accepted and
applied by most courts. Under this doctrine, the fact that a feature, concept, or process
is known or used by others in an industry does not alone indicate lack of trade secret
status. As explained in the Restatement (First) of Torts:
It is not requisite that only the proprietor of the business know it. He may,
without losing his protection, communicate it to employees involved in its
use. He may likewise communicate it to others pledged to secrecy. Others
may also know of it independently, as, for example, when they have
discovered the process or formula by independent invention and are keeping it
secret. Nevertheless, a substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that,
except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the
information.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
While the relative secrecy doctrine dispels the notion that an idea must be absolutely
secret or unique to warrant legal protection and, accordingly, seemingly opens the door
for the protection of Category 2 information, the doctrine provides courts and
corporations with little guidance as to where on the continuum between absolute secrecy
and universal knowledge specific information will become "generally known," thereby
losing trade secret status. Thus, rather than clarifying the law of trade secrets, the
relative secrecy doctrine merely adds one more layer of ambiguity to the confusion
created by the "not generally known" requirement. See cases cited supra note 62.
133. See supra notes 20, 51-68 and accompanying text. Category 3 information, by
virtue of its heightened secrecy level, generally has a much greater absolute value (i.e.
value vis-a-vis the marketplace as a whole) to its owner than does Category 2
information.
134. See supra notes 54-57, 60-63 and accompanying text.
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safeguarding both Category 2 and Category 3 information is wholly
consistent with, and, indeed, is necessary for the fulfillment of the
central goals of confidentiality law, an appropriate protective and
remedial scheme should account for the value differential between the
two categories of knowledge135 A system that simply divides the
world of commercial information into two spheres, "trade secrets" and
"general skill and knowledge," fails to acknowledge this informational
"hierarchy." Consequently, such a system impedes courts' abilities to,
in certain cases, fashion relief that is commensurate with the competing
policy interests the confidentiality law seeks to serve.
A host of courts have recognized the theoretical inadequacy of the
"one category of protectable information" system. These courts,
uncomfortable with classifying particular Category 2 information as
"trade secrets," but unwilling to countenance the deceptive methods
employed by competitors to acquire that information, have taken a
variety of measures to protect non-trade secret information from piracy
using trade secret law.'36 For example, a number of judges effectively
have afforded trade secret protection to information that is "generally
known" or "readily ascertainable" by precluding alleged
misappropriators from challenging that information's trade secret
status, unless the alleged misappropriator actually acquired the
information through independent investigative efforts or other proper
means. 137  Similarly, many courts have employed the doctrine of
135. For example, in recognition of Category 3 information's greater absolute value
and, accordingly, of the substantial policy interests to be served by affording such
information the highest level of protection, punitive damages and/or attorney fee awards
may be appropriate in actions for the unauthorized appropriation, disclosure, or use of
Category 3 data; however, such awards may not be warranted in similar actions
involving Category 2 knowledge. Similarly, "perpetual" injunctive relief-that is,
injunctive relief barring the use of proprietary data until such time as that data is
publicly disclosed, displayed, or otherwise revealed-may be warranted with respect to
unique and/or novel Category 3 information, whereas it may be appropriate to limit the
duration of injunctive relief with respect to Category 2 information to the time required
to independently develop such information. For discussions of the various
considerations relevant to affording relief in information misappropriation cases, see 3
MILGRIM, supra note 20, §15.02, Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 617-20, and Ruth
E. Leistensnider, Trade Secret Misappropriation: What is the Proper Length of an
Injunction After Public Disclosure, 51 ALB. L. REV. 271 (1987).
136. See, e.g., Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 596-604.
137. See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co, 868 F.2d 1226, 1243-44 (Fed. Cir.
1989); Goldberg v. Medtronic, Inc., 686 F.2d 1219, 1225-28 (7th Cir. 1982); FMC
Corp. v. Varco Int'l, Inc., 677 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1982); Droeger v. Welsh
Sporting Goods, Corp., 541 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1976); In re Uniservices, Inc., 517
F.2d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1975); Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Serv., Inc., 476
F.2d 386, 392 (8th Cir. 1973); Servo Corp. of America v. Gen. Elec. Co., 393 F.2d 551,
555 (4th Cir. 1968); Bolt Assoc., Inc. v. Alpine Geophysical Assoc., Inc., 365 F.2d
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equitable estoppel to prevent defendants from challenging the
protectability of knowledge that the defendant previously protected as a
"trade secret." Courts allow this despite the fact that the particular
knowledge at issue may have failed to satisfy the technical
requirements needed to acquire trade secret status.1 38  Finally,
numerous courts have protected non-trade secret, Category 2
information by utilizing the various legal theories identified in Part
II. 
13 9
The various judicial attempts to broaden the protective scope of
"trade secret" law, without expressly rejecting or redefining that law's
central tenets, are undesirable for two reasons. First, the sporadic
judicial willingness to circumvent the threshold requirements for "trade
secret" status seriously complicates businesses' and other private
actors' attempts to define accurately the boundaries of "trade secret"
law and to predict whether specific commercial data will qualify for
legal protection. 40 As previously indicated, such ambiguity is
742, 749-50 (3d Cir. 1966); Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953);
Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 374-75 (7th Cir. 1953); Hoeltke v. C.M. Kemp
Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912, 928 (4th Cir. 1935); Rodgard Corp. v. Miner Enter., Inc., 12
U.S.P.Q.2d 1353, 1360 (W.D.N.Y. 1989); Moore v. American Barmag Corp., 710 F.
Supp. 1050, 1060-61 (W.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 44 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Telerate
Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Coca-Cola Co. v. Reed
Indus. Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1211, 1217 (N.D. Ga. 1988), affd, 864 F.2d 150 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); Biodynamic Technologies, Inc. v. Chattanooga Corp., 644 F. Supp. 607,
611 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz Aktiengesellschaft, Koln v. Hewitt-
Robins Div. of Litton Sys., Inc., 486 F. Supp. 283, 286-87 (D.S.C. 1978); Crocan
Corp. v. Sheller-Globe Corp., 385 F. Supp. 251, 253-55 (N.D. I11. 1974); Sperry Rand
Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 562 (D. Conn. 1964); Affiliated Hosp. Prods.,
Inc. v. Baldwin, 373 N.E.2d 1000, 1005-06 (II. App. Ct. 1978); Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 918 (Ind. 1993); Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478,
484-86 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976); Classic Instruments, Inc. v. VDO-Argo Instruments, Inc.,
700 P.2d 677, 694 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494
S.W.2d 204, 212 (Tex. App. 1973).
138. See, e.g., In re Uniservices, Inc., 517 F.2d 492, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1975);
Telerate Sys., 689 F. Supp. at 221; Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering
Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1110, 1116 (E.D. Mich. 1975);
Affiliated Hosp. Prods., 373 N.E.2d at 1005-06; Materials Dev. Corp. v Atlantic
Advanced Metals, Inc., 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595, 605-07 (Mass. 1971); Ultra-Life
Labs., Inc. v. Eames, 221 S.W.2d 224, 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949); Fairchild Engine &
Airplane Corp. v. Cox, 50 N.Y.S.2d 643, 665 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
139. See supra Part II.B.
140. See Feldman, supra note 6, at 170-7 1; Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 642-44. As
explained by one author
The fact remains, however, that under the Restatement there is no action in
tort for the unauthorized disclosure or use of non-trade secret, confidential
information obtained in confidence. This distinction has proven troublesome
for the courts and has resulted in some decisions which, when examined in
light of the public policy interests sought to be served, are at least confusing
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fundamentally inconsistent with the central goals of confidentiality
law, as it results in both under-deterrence and over-deterrence.' 4
Second, by focusing exclusively on the alleged misappropriators'
conduct, courts utilizing the "equitable estoppel" and/or "acquisition
through improper means" theories to safeguard "non-trade secret"
information unnecessarily eviscerate the property restriction on "trade
secret" protection. 142  This restriction is necessary to maintain a
if not downright conflicting.
Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 598.
141. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. One commentator describes the
over- and under-deterrence problems associated with ambiguity as follows:
Over-deterrence occurs in a situation when the parties lack an understanding of
what constitutes a trade secret. For example, the possibility of litigation may
discourage an employee from using his or her skills and experience to pursue a
position at another firm. This creates over-deterrence because it inhibits an
employee's ability to change jobs, which creates an economic inefficiency.
The fear of a potential trade secret suit may also over-deter potential
employers from hiring a competitor's former employees, even in industries
with high employee mobility.
Ambiguity in the law also creates under-deterrence. The absence of a distinct
legal rule gives both employees and their prospective employers an incentive
to capitalize on information that is not rightfully theirs. The employer may
not be able to assess whether the information is protectable as a trade secret.
Moreover, the parties will be uncertain as to who will ultimately prevail in
litigation. The uncertainty of prevailing combined with the high costs of
litigation reduces the risk of loss to the employee who then has a greater
incentive to misappropriate. A more certain rule would help to adjust the risks
of litigation so that neither party will take advantage of an unclear rule.
Feldman, supra note 6, at 172.
142. See generally Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 444 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1971). The
"protectable property" requirement of confidentiality law serves, among other things, to
assure that only truly valuable and/or competitively advantageous knowledge,
knowledge that a business rival might reasonably seek to "acquire," is afforded legal
protection. Also, this requirement assures that only information owners who actively
and reasonably attempt to safeguard their proprietary data are able to obtain legal and/or
equitable relief. In the absence of any property requirement, for example, "it is obvious
that by disclosing an idea under delusions of confidence, the person making the
disclosure thereafter could prevent the confidante from subsequently making use of it,
even though the idea was well known prior to the date of the disclosure and open to the
use of all others in the world." Id. at 1316 (quoting Smiley v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 24
F. Supp. 294, 300 (D.N.J. 1938), aff'd 106 F.2d 314 (3d Cir. 1939)).
One author explains the importance of the "protectable property" requirement as
follows:
In actuality, the theory of protection [of trade secrets] is probably most
accurately described as a somewhat ill-defined marriage of the breach of good
faith and the use of improper means analyses. Both should begin with a
determination of whether a trade secret existed; principally a property right
analysis. It may be that an express or implied obligation of confidentiality
... will allow a court to infer value, secrecy, or both more easily. But, if the
material is truly part of the public domain, if it is information shared by all
and secured to none, there is no property interest deserving of protection.
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balance between the competing policy interests of confidentiality
law.1 43
In sum, defining and protecting only one category of commercial
information, "trade secrets," is both theoretically unsatisfactory and
practically undesirable because: (1) a unitary definition of protectable,
proprietary knowledge fails to account for the significant differences
between Category 2 and Category 3 information; and (2) current "trade
secret" definitions are inherently ambiguous or inconsistently applied.
IV. DEFINING "CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION" AND ESTABLISHING
A THREE-TIERED PROTECTIVE SCHEME
Given the insufficiency of a protective scheme that recognizes only
one class of proprietary information, legislatures and courts should
modify the current law of trade secrets by creating a more realistic,
predictable legal framework for the protection of competitively
valuable knowledge. Fashioning such a comprehensive framework
does not require the whole-scale dismantling of the common- and
statutory-law of trade secrets. Nor does it mandate an exhaustive
redefinition of the central terms and basic language of traditional trade
secret jurisprudence. Rather, judges and legislators can eliminate
many of the ambiguities, minimize the rigidity, and avoid much of the
inconsistency of the current system by taking three interrelated steps.
A. Redefining the "Not Generally Known" Requirement
First, the "not generally known" requirement for trade secret status
and protection should be defined to include only information that is
known to a minority (i.e. less than half) of persons who could obtain
economic or competitive value from its use. This simple
clarification/modification of the "not generally known" element of trade
secret law will insure that only Category 3 information will qualify as
"trade secrets."'
144
Once a property interest is established, however, conduct becomes important,
because while discovering a trade secret by improper means is actionable
[under the UTSA], discovering a trade secret through proper means is not.
Peterson, supra note 41, at 414; see also Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 605-08.
While it may seem odd that an information owners can have "evaporating" or
"diminishing" property rights in their data, technology, and "know how"-that is,
property rights that diminish as more and more persons/actors in an industry learn or
discover the proprietary knowledge-such "disappearing" rights are quite common in the
law. See I MILGRIM, supra note 20, § 2.01, at 2-10; Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 32, at
631.
143. See Peterson, supra note 41, at 414.
144. There can be no doubt that so defining the "not generally known" requirement
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B. Eliminating the "Not Readily Ascertainable by Proper Means"
Requirement
Second, any requirement that information not be "readily
ascertainable by proper means" to qualify for legal protection should
be eliminated.'45 There is no rational or reasonable argument as to
why an individual or corporate actor should be permitted to employ
improper "short cuts" to acquire commercial knowledge-to avoid
"paying the price in labor, money, or machines expended by the
discoverer"'-simply because that actor theoretically could have
obtained the knowledge through proper means. 47  Indeed, as
recognized by a host of courts and commentators, the basic principles
underlying confidentiality law dictate that a person or business who
can acquire information through independent effort and/or legitimate
methods should so acquire that information.48 Logically, the easier
(or cheaper) it is properly to develop commercial data, technology or
know-how, the less immoral or unethical acquisition tactics should be
will foster much litigation as to, among other things, which and what type of actors in a
particular field are to be "counted" in the majority/minority inquiry, as well as the nature
and amount of proof necessary to demonstrate that particular information is or is not
known to a majority of persons in an industry. Yet, such litigation will not differ
substantially in tone or complexity from that which currently exists with respect to the
"not generally known" requirement.
Significantly, the proposed redefinition of the "not generally known" requirement is
not intended to require a precise, mathematical calculation as to the exact number of
individuals or companies in a field that actually know of specific data. Rather, the
known only to a minority of persons who could obtain economic or competitive value
from its use formulation is designed merely to provide courts and litigants with a
guidepost as to the point at which information ceases to qualify for trade secret status.
As in the present system, judges and juries will need to rely on the testimony of
witnesses (both fact and expert) as to the extent of industry knowledge in making the
"generally known" determination. See Peterson, supra note 41, at 415-17.
145. The UTSA explicitly includes a "not readily ascertainable by proper means"
requirement. The First Restatement directs consideration of "the ease or difficulty with
which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others" in determining
trade secret status. The Third Restatement provides that the information must be
"sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over
others." See "trade secret" definitions contained supra note 122.
Interestingly, the California legislature eliminated the "not readily ascertainable by
proper means" requirement when adopting a version of the UTSA in 1984. See CAL. CIv.
CODE § 3426. 1(d) (West 1997).
146. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir.
1934), modified, 74 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1935).
147. See Neufeld, supra note 44, at 922-23.
148. See cases cited supra note 137; see also Neufeld, supra note 44, at 922-23
(asserting that the deletion of the words "and not readily ascertainable by proper means"
from the UTSA is an improvement because it strengthens the definition of trade secret
and advances the essential purpose of trade secret protection).
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tolerated.'49
C. Delineating a Class of "Confidential Information"
Third, and most importantly, courts and/or legislatures should
delineate a separate and independent class of protectable knowledge to
fill the theoretical gap between "trade secrets" and "general skill and
knowledge." This class would include commercially valuable,
Category 2 information that would not, and should not, be entitled to
trade secret protection under the more restrictive, proposed definition
of "not generally known.' 5 0  Specifically, this second class of
proprietary data, "confidential information," should be defined as:
(1) Information that is novel as to an individual or company
that: (a) seeks to acquire and/or use, or has acquired and/or used,
the information; and (b) that could obtain, or has obtained,
economic or competitive value from the information's
acquisition and/or use;
15 1
149. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text (discussing confidentiality law's
concern for preserving commercial morality).
150. See supra notes 60-63, 66 and accompanying text (explaining the value of
Category 2 information and the importance of affording it protection).
15 1. As used in this proposed definition, the term "novel" denotes not creative
genius or inventiveness, but rather uniqueness and/or value vis-&-vis the person/actor
attempting to acquire (or having already acquired) the disputed information. Novelty is
an external concept, not a concept inherent to the information itself. See INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.05, at 5-48.
Where the persons ultimately seeking to acquire or to use particular information are
former employees or agents of the purported information owner, information should be
deemed "novel" where: (1) the owner devoted a considerable amount of time, effort and
expense to develop the information; or (2) the information is unknown to one or more
of the owner's competitors who could derive value from possessing that information. In
short, when an information owner has expended significant resources to obtain specific
information that others do not have, the law should presume that the information is
sufficiently valuable to warrant legal protection from misuse by persons under
contractual or common-law duties of loyalty. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying
text.
Where the persons ultimately seeking to acquire or to use particular information are
competing companies or other unaffiliated third-parties, information should be deemed
novel where it was not previously possessed by those companies or third-parties. Some
commentators undoubtedly will maintain that using such a subjective test of novelty
will extend the protections of confidentiality law too far by permitting the protection of
publicly available information that may easily be obtained through proper means. See
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.05[3], at 5-50. According to these critics, an
objective standard of novelty, meaning a standard analogous to the not readily
ascertainable by proper means standard of trade secret law, is necessary to assure that
particular information possesses sufficient value (in absolute terms) to warrant legal
protection. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 5.05, at 5-48. See also
Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 32, at 617-25 (advocating denial of property status to
ideas that are not both novel and reduced to a tangible, workable form).
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These commentators' claims notwithstanding, however, the proposed "novelty as to
the acquirer and/or user" standard is desirable for three reasons. First, contrary to critics'
contentions, the subjective test for confidential information adequately assures that
specific knowledge is of value to the individual or company who seeks to acquire it. If
information were truly useful and easy to obtain through proper means, it is logical to
assume that persons who could make use of that information would so acquire it. If such
persons have not acquired that information, one of two circumstances logically must
exist: (1) the persons have not identified the potential value of the easily acquired
information; or (2) the persons have not identified the means, however easy or proper,
for obtaining the valuable information. In either circumstance, the persons' acquisition
of the information and/or knowledge of its utility from an owner who properly
developed and applied that information is unquestionably of some value to the acquirer.
See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 90-91 (Minn. 1979)
("There would be little purpose in taking such a quantity of documents if defendants did
not believe the information was valuable."); Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 597.
As one court explained with respect to an implied-in-fact contract claim:
On the one hand, how can sellers prove that the buyer obtained the idea from
them, and nowhere else, and that the buyer's use of it thus constitutes
misappropriation of property? . . . A showing of novelty, at least novelty as
to the buyer, addresses these two concerns. Novelty can then serve to
establish both the attributes of ownership necessary for a property-based
claim and the value of consideration-the disclosure-necessary for the
contract-based claims.
Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095, 1098 (N.Y. 1993) (emphasis
added); see also Lionel S. Sobel, The Law of Ideas, Revisited, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 9,
56-63 (1994) (suggesting that novelty be used as evidence of value).
Second, the subjective test of novelty promotes commercial morality. Under the
current, two-tiered system, in which information is either "trade secret" or "general skill
and knowledge," information that is "readily ascertainable by proper means" receives no
legal protection. Individuals and/or companies interested in utilizing such information
may resort to otherwise improper "short cuts" (e.g. breaching contractual
confidentiality obligations, inducing employees to reveal their employers' knowledge,
etc.) to acquire it. Yet, as previously noted, the basic principles underlying
confidentiality law dictate that a corporate actor who can acquire information through
independent effort should. By removing the objective component and focusing
exclusively on whether information is novel to the person seeking it, the proposed
definition of confidential information encourages the use of proper means with respect
to all commercially valuable information. See supra notes 24-29, 135-36 and
accompanying text.
Third, any concerns as to the potentially negative, competitive effect of the broad
legal protection afforded by use of a "novelty as to the acquirer and/or user" standard
likely will be addressed in the calculation of damages. Under the proposed three-tiered
system, a corporate actor who improperly acquires or uses confidential information may
be subject to liability. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text. However, if the
information acquired or used is truly easily or cheaply obtained through proper means,
the potential damage award against the actor is likely to be extremely small. Thus, to
relieve corporate actors of liability entirely under such circumstances would not only
send the wrong message, but would unfairly preclude courts from recognizing the value
of information which owners identified. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text;
see also Kitch, supra note 48, at 671 (discussing limitations on length of injunctions as
"ameliorat[ing] some of the harshness that follows from a finding of a trade secrecy
violation").
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(2) Information that is not necessary for entry or participation
in the relevant field, industry or practice; 52 and
(3) Information that is treated as confidential by its owner. 53
As with trade secrets, merely identifying particular knowledge as
"confidential information" would not permit an information owner to
exclude others from any use of that information."M Rather, owners of
152. In assessing whether information is "necessary" for entry or participation in a
particular field or industry, the following factors might be considered:
(1) The specificity with which the information is defined (i.e. whether the
information is capable of being, and/or has been, defined with particularity, or
whether its identification vague, abstract, or limitless);
(2) The information's degree of specialization (i.e. whether it is data,
technology, or know-how having many applications or whether its utility is
limited to a specific product, process, or market niche);
(3) The relative contributions of the information owner, the alleged
misappropriator, and third parties in developing the information;
(4) The ease (or difficulty) with which reasonable limits or restrictions could
be imposed on the use and/or disclosure of the information;
(5) The availability of alternative (or substitute) data, technologies, and/or
know-how; and
(6) Others' empirical and/or logical ability to operate (and/or success in
operating) without the information.
See Victoria A. Cundiff, The New ALl Restatement and Trade Secrets, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW INSTITUTE 1995, 683, 691-93 (416 PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks
and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 416, 1995); Davidson & DeMay,
supra note 5, at 613-14; Letty S. Friesen, Distinguishing Between an Employee's
General Knowledge and Trade Secrets, 23 COLO. LAW. 2123 (1994); Kitch, supra note
48, at 671.
153. Whereas the first prong of this definition is concerned with "novelty" and
"value," the third prong is concerned with "secrecy"-that is, the degree to which an
information owner treats (and has treated) its data, technology and know-how as
confidential and proprietary. Thus, the proposed definition requires both an external and
an internal inquiry: Is the information novel and valuable to the person/actor who seeks
to obtain (or who has obtained) that information? Has the proprietor used sufficient
effort to prevent its disclosure?
One commentary explained the need for a "secrecy" requirement as follows:
The resolution of this threshold trade secret test should depend first upon
whether the information has been maintained as a secret by the plaintiff. If
the information has been available to others who could obtain economic
benefit from its disclosure or use, there is no justification for protection even
against one to whom the information may have been disclosed in confidence.
However, the policies underlying trade secret law do not require absolute
secrecy. All that is necessary is relative secrecy. The information in question
must be subject to efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain secrecy against other persons who might use or disclose it.
Davidson & DeMay, supra note 5, at 606; see also 1 MILGRIM, supra note 20, §§ 1.04,
1.05.
154. The UTSA prohibits only the "misappropriation" of trade secrets. See UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2, 3, 14 U.L.A. 449, 455 (1990). "Misappropriation" is defined
as:
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confidential information would only be able to preclude others from
using that information in violation of specific statutory, contractual or
common-law duties.155.
D. The Positive Effects of Establishing a Three-Tiered Protective
Scheme
Reinterpreting the "not generally known" criterion for trade secret
status, eliminating the "not readily ascertainable by proper means"
(i) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(ii) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied
consent by a person who
(A) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper
means to acquire it;
(II) Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to
maintain its secrecy or limits its use; or
(III) Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the
person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limits its use; or
(C) Before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to know
that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by
accident or mistake.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1, 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
The First Restatement similarly provides:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so,
is liable to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by
the other in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it was
a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the
third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other,
or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that its
disclosure was made to him by mistake.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
155. As eloquently described by the court in Tabor v. Hoffman:
If a valuable medicine, not protected by patent, is put upon the market, any
one may, if he can by chemical analysis and a series of experiments, or by any
other use of the medicine itself, aided by his resources only, discover the
ingredients and their proportions. If he thus finds out the secret of the
proprietor, he may use it to any extent that he desires without danger of
interference by the courts. But, because this discovery may be possible by fair
means, it would not justify a discovery by unfair means, such as the bribery of
a clerk who, in the course of his employment, had aided in compounding the
medicine, and had thus become familiar with the formula.
Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (N.Y. 1889).
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requirement, and defining a distinct category of "confidential
information" would have a number of positive effects for existing trade
law. First, these alterations unquestionably would enable courts to
protect both Category 2 and Category 3 information from various
forms of theft, while permitting judges to recognize the qualitative
differences between the two categories of knowledge. Courts no
longer would be forced to choose between leaving Category 2
information wholly unprotected and extending (or circumventing)
"trade secret" law to cover all commercially valuable information,
regardless of its secrecy level." 6
Second, these modifications would create a more structured and
well-defined regime for the protection of proprietary knowledge. With
this new definition, courts and corporations would be better able to
determine whether specific technical and business information is likely
to qualify for legal protection from piracy.157 In addition, corporations
would be able to analyze the economics of product and process
development, the need (or lack thereof) for extensive investment in
security, and the risks associated with information-sharing and/or
acquisition.
Third, the creation of a three-tiered system for the classification and
protection of commercial information 58 would balance employers'
legitimate interests in safeguarding their data with employees' concerns
regarding their ability to move within the industry. Employees could
continue to use information that is universally known, freely
disseminated by their former employers, or necessary for participation
in the field. Employees would be prohibited from using or disclosing
only confidential information which affords their employers
competitive advantages vis-a-vis competitors who do not already
possess such information. 59
156. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
158. A three-tiered system is one in which information is classified either as "trade
secret," as "confidential information," or as "general skill and knowledge."
159. For cases in which courts either expressly or implicitly utilized similar or
analogous definitions of confidential information, see Eaton Corp. v. Giere, 971 F.2d
136, 141 (8th Cir. 1992); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sipula, 776 F.2d 157, 163-64 (7th Cir.
1985); Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Serv., Inc., 476 F.2d 386, 392 (8th Cir.
1973); Tlapek v. Chevron Oil Co., 407 F.2d 1129, 1135 (8th Cir. 1969); TDS
Healthcare Sys. Corp. v. Humana Hosp. Ill., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1572, 1584-85 (N.D.
Ga. 1995); American Hardware Mut'l Ins. Co. v. Moran, 545 F. Supp. 192, 197-98 (N.D.
III. 1982), aff'd, 705 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1983); Organic Chems., Inc. v. Carroll Prods.,
Inc, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 628, 631-32 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Standard Brands, Inc. v.
Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 262 (E.D. La. 1967); Millard Maintenance Serv. Co. v.
Bernero, 566 N.E.2d 379, 385 (I11. App. Ct. 1990); Tower Oil & Tech. Co., v. Buckley,
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In short, establishing a three-tiered protective scheme will: (1)
significantly reduce the ambiguity of current trade secret law with
respect to the protection for Category 2 information; (2) enable judges
to give effect to the essential differences between Category 2 and
Category 3 information; and (3) permit courts to maintain the
necessary equilibrium between the often conflicting goals of
preserving commercial morality, promoting invention, and sustaining
free, open and competitive economic markets.
V. PROTECTING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION IN UTSA
JURISDICTIONS
Even absent the legislative and/or judicial creation of a formal
category of "confidential information," litigants may continue to seek
protection for "confidential information" by using the various theories
identified and discussed in Part II-breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, interference with contractual relations, fraud,
conversion, unjust enrichment and conspiracy."'6 While each of these
theories unquestionably remains available to information owners in
jurisdictions relying exclusively on the First Restatement, the Third
Restatement and/or the common-law, there remains considerable
uncertainty as to which of, and to what extent, these legal theories
retain vitality in those jurisdictions that model their trade secret statutes
on the UTSA. 161
A. The UTSA's Preemption Provision and its Effect on Common-
Law Claims for Breach of Contract, Breach of Fiduciary Duty and
Fraud
Of the forty-two jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia)
that have adopted some form of the UTSA, fifteen have adopted the
UTSA's preemption provision verbatim, 62 twenty-four have adopted
425 N.E.2d 1060, 1066-67 (II1. App. Ct. 1981); Davis v. Eagle Prods., Inc., 501 N.E.2d
1099, 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278
N.W.2d 81, 89 (Minn. 1979).
For discussions of "confidential information" defined in the context of discovery
disputes under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see James R. Jarrow, Industrial
Espionage? Discovery Within the Rules of Civil Procedure and The Battle for Protective
Orders Governing Trade Secrets and Confidential Information, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 318,
320-21 (1993) and David Timmins, Comment, Protective Orders in Products Liability
Litigation: Striking the Proper Balance, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1513 n.64
(1991).
160. See supra Part II.B.
161. See 1 MILGRIM, supra note 20, § 1.01[31[a].
162. Section 7 of the UTSA, the UTSA's "Effect on Other Law" provision states:
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some variation of this provision, and three have omitted an "Effect on
Other Law" provision entirely.1 6 Section 7 of the UTSA, by its very
terms, makes clear that the UTSA is not "a catchall for industrial
torts."
,
'
6
Thus, the UTSA specifically exempts from its preemptive penumbra
those claims that involve "more" than the mere misappropriation or
misuse of "trade secrets." In other words, the UTSA does not
preempt claims that implicate contractual, common-law and/or
statutory duties that do not depend entirely upon the existence of
technical "trade secrets." '65 These exempted claims include breach of
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), this [Act] displaces conflicting tort,
restitutionary, and other law of this State providing civil remedies for
misappropriation of a trade secret.
(b) This [Act] does not affect:
(1) contractual remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a
trade secret;
(2) other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a
trade secret; or
(3) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a
trade secret.
UNIF. TRADE SECRErS Acr § 7, 14 U.L.A. 463 (1990).
163. See id.
164. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 897 (Minn.
1983). Indeed, the 1990 comment to section 7 specifically explains:
This Act does not deal with criminal remedies for trade secret misappropriation
and is not a comprehensive statement of civil remedies. It applies to a duty to
protect competitively significant secret information that is imposed by law.
It does not apply to a duty voluntarily assumed through an express or an
implied-in-fact contract. The enforceability of covenants not to disclose trade
secrets and covenants not to compete that are intended to protect trade secrets,
for example, is governed by other law. The Act also does not apply to a duty
imposed by law that is not dependent upon the existence of competitively
significant secret information, like an agent's duty of loyalty to his or her
principal.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 463 (1990).
165. As explained by one court:
The court first notes that [the "Effect on Other Law" section] is clear in that
some prior law is meant to be displaced, otherwise the subsection would be
superfluous. However, the court does not think the displacement is to be as
widespread as defendants wish, nor as limited as plaintiff contends. The
plaintiff's interpretation would allow simultaneous common law and statutory
actions in the same trade secret case. This court disagrees .... the common
law of trade secrets is now changed to correlate exactly to the [Minnesota
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (MUTSA)]. Any variation of common law from the
statute is a conflict and is displaced by the MUTSA. Therefore, a separate
cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets is now displaced and such
actions must be brought under the MUTSA.
However, the displacement of the common law is not as broad as
defendants suggest. Only that law which conflicts with the MUTSA is
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express or implied-in-fact contract,166 tortious interference with
contractual relations, 67 breach of implied-in-law contract," breach of
loyalty/trust,' 69 fraud/misrepresentation, 7 0 and conversion of tangible
displaced. Conflicting law is that law dealing exclusively with trade secrets.
To the extent a cause of action exists in the commercial area not dependent on
trade secrets, that cause continues to exist. For example, in [Rehabilitation
Specialists, Inc. v. Koering, 404 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)], causes
of action were allowed to be brought simultaneously for breach of a duty of
loyalty and unfair competition, as well as for trade secrets. In that case the
first two causes of action had as their underlying wrong the soliciting of
customers and employees by the defendant while still employed by the
plaintiff. The MUTSA claim was based on the misappropriation of the
plaintiff's policy and procedures manual. The common law and statutory
counts, therefore, addressed distinct "wrongs." The MUTSA used in this
manner is not "a catch-all for industrial torts," but is the distinctive way in
which to prosecute actions involving trade secrets.
Micro Display Sys., Inc. v. Axtel, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 202, 204-05 (D. Minn. 1988); see
also Defcon, Inc. v. Webb, 687 So.2d 639, 642-43 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
166. See, e.g., TDS Healthcare Sys. Corp. v. Humana Hosp. Ill., Inc., 880 F. Supp.
1572, 1584-86 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Editions Play Bac, S.A. v. Western Publ'g Co., 31
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1338, 1343 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc., No. Civ..A. CV 92-1654, 1992 WL 159803, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 1992),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Crouch,
606 F. Supp. 464, 468-69 (S.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1986); Legal
Serv. Plans, Inc. v. Heneghan, Pikor, Kennedy & Allen, No. CV-90 29448, 1990 WL
283681, at *1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1990); Michels v. Dyna-Kote Indus., Inc.,
497 N.E.2d 586, 589 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Saliterman v. Finney, 361 N.W.2d 175, 178
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 674 (Wash.
1987).
167. See, e.g., Smithfield Ham & Prods. Co., v. Portion Pac, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 346,
347-49 (E.D. Va. 1995); ITT Schadow, Inc. v. Stein, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1348, 1351 (D.
Minn. 1988); Legal Serv. Plans, 1990 WL 283681, at *1-2.
168. See, e.g., Crouch, 606 F. Supp. at 470-71; Legal Serv. Plans, 1990 WL
283681, at *1-2.
169. See, e.g., Omnitech Int'l, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316, 1330-31 (5th Cir.
1994); Eaton Corp. v. Giere, 971 F.2d 136, 141 (8th Cir. 1992); Coulter Corp. v.
Leinert, 869 F. Supp. 732, 734-35 (E.D. Mo. 1994); Vigoro Indus., Inc. v. Cleveland
Chem. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1150, 1164-65 (E.D. Ark. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part
sub nor. Vigoro Indus., Inc. v. Crisp, 82 F.3d 785 (8th Cir.), and reh'g denied sub nom.
Vigoro Indus., Inc. v. Crisp, 82 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 1996); Earthdweller, Ltd. v.
Rothnagel, No. 93 C 3790, 1993 WL 487546, at *7 (N.D. III. Nov. 22, 1993); Avtec
Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 805 F. Supp. 1312, 1321 (E.D. Va. 1992), affd in part, vacated in
part, 21 F.3d 568 (4th Cir. 1994); Herbster. v. Global Intermediary, Inc., No. Civ. A. 89-
2198-V, 1991 WL 205659, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 11, 1991); Micro Display Sys., Inc. v.
Axtel, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 202, 205 (D. Minn. 1988); 17T Schadow, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1351; Crouch, 606 F. Supp. at 472; Defcon, Inc., 687 So.2d at 643; Rehabilitation
Specialists, Inc. v. Koering, 404 N.W.2d 301, 305-06 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987);
Saliterman, 361 N.W.2d at 178-79; Boeing Co., 738 P.2d at 674.
The fact that claims for breach of loyalty/trust implicate many of the same factual and
legal issues involved in actions for trade secret misappropriation does not compel a
finding of preemption. See Editions Play Bac, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1343.
170. See, e.g., Earthdweller, 1993 WL 487546, at *7; Herbster, 1991 WL 205659, at
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property. 171
B. Conflicting Views Concerning the Displacement of Breach of
Confidence, Unfair Competition, Unjust Enrichment, and Conversion
of Invention Claims
Unlike claims that derive from contractual or common-law duties
independent of the presence of "trade secrets,"" actions for breach of
confidence, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and conversion of
invention typically arise from the wrongful acquisition or use of
valuable proprietary data; and, consequently, these claims duplicate the
substance of claims brought under the various states' trade secret
statutes. 73 Given these claims' usual identity with actions for relief
under the UTSA, courts are confused as to whether these claims truly
"conflict" with the UTSA such that they are "displaced" pursuant to
section 7174 In fact, three very different and inconsistent views of the
UTSA's preemptive scope have emerged.
* 1; Micro Display Sys., 699 F. Supp. at 205.
171. See, e.g., Micro Display Sys., 699 F. Supp. at 203-05; ITT Schadow, 7
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1351.
In essence, the reason that these claims generally are not deemed to be "displaced" by
the UTSA is that they, by definition, do not require the existence of "trade secrets." For
example, the scope of an agent's (or employee's) duty of loyalty to his or her principal
(or employer) is not limited to protecting the principal (or employer) against disclosure
of trade secrets. Similarly, the duty of all persons to refrain from defrauding another is
not restricted to avoiding making material misstatements or omissions in order to
obtain trade secret knowledge. See 1 MILGRIM, supra note 20, § 1.01[3][a], at 1-68.13.
172. This category of claims includes breach of contract, tortious interference with
contract, breach of loyalty, fraud, and conversion of tangible property claims. See
Leistensnider, supra note 135, at 278-79.
173. One commentator explained:
Whether or not a variety of state claims coupled with UTSA claims are or are
not "preempted" by the UTSA should turn upon whether or not the other claims
"conflict." If the other claims are no more than a restatement of the same
operative facts which would plainly and exclusively spell out only trade secret
misappropriation, then dressing those claims up in different clothing is not
likely to be found consistent with the preempting dictates of UTSA.
I MILGRIM, supra note 20, § 1.01[3][a], at 1-68.13 (emphasis omitted); see Victoria A.
Cundiff, Trade Secret Law/Contracts/Misappropriation: Are They Preempted?, in SECOND
ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 61, 83-84 (453 PLI/Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary Property Course Handbook Series, 1996).
174. See Neufeld, supra note 44, at 900.
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1. The First View: Preemption of All Non-UTSA Mechanisms for the
Protection of Intangible Property
The first, and most restrictive, of these views regards the UTSA's
"Effect on Other Law" provision 75 as defining the "outer limit" of
available protection for valuable, commercial information. Courts
adopting this view consistently hold that: (1) the only mechanism
available for the protection of intangible property is an action under a
state's trade secret act; and, (2) that common-law theories pertaining
exclusively to the protection of trade secrets or confidential information
are necessarily preempted. 76
175. UNIF. TRADE SECRErS ACT § 7, 14 U.L.A. 463 (1990).
176. See Omnitech Int'l, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316, 1330-31 (5th Cir. 1994);
Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir.
1992); Web Communications Group, Inc. v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 316,
320-21 (N.D. I11. 1995); Cohn v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 92 C 5852, 1994 WL 13769, at
*10 (N.D. III. Jan. 14, 1994); Hutchison v. KFC Corp., 809 F. Supp. 68, 71-72 (D. Nev.
1992); Chicago Show Printing Co. v. Sherwood, No. 92 C 309, 1992 WL 175577, at *3
(N.D. 11. Jul. 14, 1992); Ace Novelty Co. v. Vijuk Equip., Inc., No. 90 C 3116, 1990
WL 129510, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 1990).
Some courts appear to have taken this view to its logical end, finding that the UTSA
precludes even breach of loyalty, tortious interference with contract, fraud, and breach of
implied-in-law contract claims. See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262,
1264 (7th Cir. 1995); Composite Marine, 962 F.2d at 1265; J.H. Chapman Group, Ltd.
v. Chapman, No. 95 C 7716, 1996 WL 89075, at * 2-3 (N.D. II. Feb. 28, 1996);
Venango River Corp. v. NIPSCO Indus., Inc., No. 92 C 2412, 1995 WL 410842, at *1
(N.D. I11. July 11, 1995); C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., No. 93 C 1601, 1994 WL
30540, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 1994); Allied Supply Co. v. Brown, 585 So.2d 33, 37
(Ala. 1991). Yet, such an extreme approach is not only unwise, but renders meaningless
the specific statutory language preserving "other civil remedies that are not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret." As one Illinois court faced with counts for fraud and
breach of loyalty explained:
By its very terms, the Illinois Trade Secrets Act precludes only conflicting
causes of action for misappropriation of trade secrets, and not those claims
which allege more than mere misuse or misappropriation of trade secrets.
In the instant case, [plaintiff's] "fraud" count is based on the false
representations that enabled [defendants] to develop their own competing
business, rather than act as [plaintiff's] licensee. [Plaintiff's] "breach of
fiduciary duty" count claims unjust enrichment, based on the allegation that
[defendant] breached his duty to use the confidential information entrusted to
him in his official capacity as [plaintiff's] business consultant in furtherance
of [plaintiff's] best interests.
These counts seek recovery for wrongs beyond the mere misappropriation.
As such, these common law claims are related to, but not in conflict with
[plaintiff's] trade secrets claim.
Earthdweller, Ltd. v. Rothnagel, No. 93 C 3790, 1993 WL 487546, at *7 (N.D. III. Nov.
22, 1993).
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2. The Second View: Limiting UTSA Preemption to Technical Trade
Secrets
The second view pertaining to UTSA preemption maintains that the
UTSA merely defines the outer limit of protection for technical "trade
secrets" (as opposed to other commercially valuable information).
Courts adopting this view maintain that, where specific information
qualifies as a "trade secret," the only action available to the information
owner is under the trade secret statute. Where particular information
does not rise to the level of a trade secret, however, these courts
suggest that the information owner may assert claims under any of the
various protective theories outlined in Part II.r7
3. The Third View: Allowing Protection of Intangible Property Under
any Legal Theory
Finally, the third view of the UTSA's preemption provision
interprets the phrase "conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law"' 78
as referring only to common-law doctrines that effectively deny or
restrict the relief available under a state's trade secret statute. Courts
adhering to this view hold that information owners may seek to protect
their intangible property, such as trade secrets and/or confidential
information, using any legal theory. 79 This includes theories
affording more or broader protection than the trade secret act so long
as the specific theories asserted do not undercut or limit the protections
expressly provided by the UTSA.'80
C. The First View As Most Appropriate
In the absence of any specific legislative guidance, the first view of
the UTSA's preemptive scope is the most reasonable.' 8' States
177. See, e.g., Devon Indus., Inc. v. American Medical Int'l, Inc., 61 F.3d 910 (9th
Cir. 1995), available in Nos. 94-55074, 94-55211, 1995 WL 433951, at *1, *4 (Nov.
7, 1995); Vigoro Indus., Inc. v. Cleveland Chem. Co., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1150, 1160-
61 (E.D. Ark. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Vigoro Indus., Inc. v. Crisp, 82
F.3d 785 (8th Cir.), and reh'g denied sub nom. Vigoro Indus., Inc. v. Crisp, 82 F.3d 785
(8th Cir. 1996).
178. See supra note 162.
179. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., No. Civ. A. CV 92-1654-R,
1992 WL 159803, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 991 F.2d
511 (9th Cir. 1993); Legal Serv. Plans, Inc. v. Heneghan, Pikor, Kennedy & Allen, No.
CV-90 299448, 1990 WL 283681, at *1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1990).
180. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
181. That is, the view that the UTSA displaces actions for conversion of invention,
breach of confidence, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment, but leaves unaffected
actions for breach of contract (express, implied-in-fact, and implied-in-law), tortious
interference with contractual relations, breach of loyalty, fraud, and conversion of
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adopting statutory provisions analogous to the UTSA's section 7
intend that at least some prior law relating to the protection of
commercial information be displaced." Permitting litigants in UTSA
states to assert common-law claims for the misappropriation or misuse
of confidential data would reduce the UTSA to just another basis for
recovery and leave prior law effectively untouched.'83 Further, by
expressly exempting "contractual remedies, whether or not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret" and "other civil remedies that are
not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret" from its preemptive
penumbra, the UTSA makes clear that only those claims addressing or
arising out of wrongs distinct from pure information piracy" survive
passage of the trade secret statute. Indeed, contrary interpretations of
the UTSA's "Effect on Other Law" provision, such as those embodied
in the second and third views of UTSA preemption, effectively negate
the UTSA's goal of promoting uniformity in "trade secrets" law. 8 5
Additionally, these contrary interpretations render the statutory
preemption provision effectively meaningless."s
tangible property. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
182. See I MILGRIM, supra note 20, § 1.01[31[a], at 1-68.12.
183. One scholar noted the danger of applying the UTSA's preemption provision too
broadly:
The preemption provisions can be somewhat worrisome if they are applied
mechanistically or overly conceptually. Our common law is richly flexible in
redressing wrongs for improper conduct which in full or in part involves the
use of information derived from the plaintiff.
A readily cognizable tort, such as diversion of corporate opportunities, is
essentially a mechanism of law intended to redress disloyal conduct and is
likely to be applicable whether or not the underlying information is a trade
secret. It would be a pity if courts apply the preemption statute provisions in
such a way as to overlook the fact that our legal system encourages pleading in
the alternative. One might believe that certain information is a trade secret
and so plead it. However, even if it is not a trade secret, traditional tort
theories prohibit its use in a disloyal or unfair fashion in limited and well
defined circumstances, such as where the information is used to usurp a
corporate opportunity.
1 MILGRIM, supra note 20, § 1.01[31[a], at 1-68.14.
184. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7, 14 U.L.A. 463 (1990). That is, claims for
which misappropriation or misuse of confidential knowledge is merely proof of a
defendant's "wrong" (e.g. disloyalty to an employer or principal, breach of a contractual
obligation, fraudulent conduct, etc.) rather than the "wrong" itself.
185. See Micro Display Sys. v. Axtel, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 202, 204-05 (D. Minn.
1988).
186. As explained by one court adopting the first view of UTSA preemption:
Defendants claim plaintiff's common law tort claims [conversion, commercial
bribery, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment] are conflicting, and
plaintiff claims they are not, suggesting a literal meaning of "conflicting."
Under plaintiff's interpretation, all the common law theories of recovery
remain available which makes the UTSA one of many available theories of
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Regardless of which of the three views of the UTSA preemption a
particular jurisdiction accepts, ample room remains for the protection
of confidential knowledge that does not rise to the level of trade
secrets, even absent the formal creation of a separate category of
"confidential information." Under the best-reasoned, first view, such
protection is available through breach of contract, breach of loyalty,
fraud and tortious interference with contract actions. 87 Under the
second and third views, such protection is available through claims
under any and all of the legal theories described in Part II of this
Article. ma
VI. CONCLUSION
A careful analysis of the nature and types of valuable commercial
information and the various competing policy interests of
confidentiality law"s reveals the need for the creation of a three-tiered
system for the protection of competitively advantageous knowledge.
This system should classify valuable business information as either
"trade secrets," "confidential information," or "general skill and
knowledge." Such a three-tiered system will, at best, eliminate and, at
worst, minimize the ambiguity of current trade secret law with respect
to the availability of protection for widely, though not universally,
known data and know-how-Category 2 information.19° This system
will also permit judges to recognize and to give effect to the essential
differences between Category 2 and Category 3 information by
invoking different legal theories and granting different types and/or
recovery. That result would not be in line with the purpose of the Act. The
purpose of the Act was to "systemize and unify the policies underlying the
common law theories of recovery used to impose legal duties in order to
protect competitively significant information."
ITT Schadow Inc. v. Stein, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1348, 1352 (D. Minn. 1988) (quoting Steve
Borgman, The Adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act: How Uniform is Uniform? 27
IDEA 73, 108 (1986)).
It should be noted that while an information owner may assert actions for breach of
contract, breach of loyalty, and fraud, in addition to or along with, a claim for
misappropriation of trade secrets, an information owner may not obtain double recovery
for the same injury: "a 'successful plaintiff is entitled to one, but only one full recovery,
no matter how many theories support entitlement."' 205 Corp. v. Brandow, 517
N.W.2d 548, 551 (Iowa 1994) (quoting Clark-Peterson Co. v. Independent Ins. Assocs.,
514 N.W.2d 912, 915 (Iowa 1994)).
187. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
189. See supra Part II.A. As discussed earlier, policy interests include preservation of
commercial morality, promotion of invention, and maintenance of free, open, and
competitive economic markets.
190. See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text.
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amounts of relief in actions involving "trade secrets" as compared to
those involving "confidential information."' 9' Finally, a three-tiered
system will enable courts to strike the proper balance between
confidentiality law's concerns for discouraging information piracy and
assuring employee mobility.
Even without the formal definition of a second class of protectable,
proprietary information to fill the theoretical and practical gap between
"trade secrets" and "general skill and knowledge," however, there
currently exists numerous theories that provide legal protection to
confidential information that does not rise to the level of trade secrets.
Indeed, judges and litigants frequently have invoked these theories to
safeguard competitively beneficial, non-trade secret information from
piracy." Many, if not most of these legal theories for the protection
of "confidential information" remain viable, even in jurisdictions that
have adopted the UTSA and its broad preemption provision.
In sum, whether through formal legal change, through thoughtful
pleading, or through considered judicial decision-making, legislators,
litigants and courts faced with the complex task of determining the
degree of protection that appropriately should be afforded valuable,
commercial information (1) must recognize and account for the
existence of different types and levels of competitively significant
knowledge, and (2) must consider and attempt to effectuate the central
policy goals of confidentiality law. Only through such a thoughtful,
layered approach to the problem of information protection can a truly
flexible, yet predictable; consistent, yet responsive; and malleable, yet
well-defined legal regime be created and maintained.
191. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
192. These include: breach of contract (express, implied-in-fact, and implied-in-law);
tortious interference with contractual relations; breach of confidence; breach of
loyalty/trust; unfair competition; fraud/misrepresentation; unjust enrichment/
constructive trust; and/or civil conspiracy. See supra Part ll.B.
890 [Vol. 29
